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ABSTRACT 
Since 1868, Japan has displayed a very strong 
propensity for rapid growth. Before this date, Japan's 
economy was so backward as to be indistinguishable from 
the other backward nations of Asia; while after this 
date she transmitted to the position of being the sole, 
highly industrialized country of the continent and the 
third largest economy of the world. 
This study examines the economic history of 
Japan with a view to identifying the factors that have 
contributed significantly to Japan's impressive and unique 
record of economic development. Therefore, there are two 
sets of questions to answer. One is to observe the history 
j 
to find out 'what happened'. The other is to provide an 
analysis as to 'how it happened'. The socio-economic 
conditions of the two centuries preceding the year 1868 
and the years thereafter have been placed on historical 
perspective. This is the subject of Part One. To the 
iii 
extent that each of these socio-economic conditions was 
abolished, left unchanged, altered or otherwise utilized 
to pursue a growing modern economy is the subject of Part 
Two. The method used in this study is time-series analysis, 
based on data provided mainly by Japanese and Western 
institutions and private individuals. Thus, each chapter 
contains a chronological order of events, phases, and policies. 
In conclusion, although the economy has been subject 
to many erratic fluctuations, the long-run tendency has been 
an acceleration of the growth rate and the development of an 
ever-increasing capacity for growth. 
iv 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the history of Japan the year 1868 is a turning point 
marking her entry into a new era. The new era was noted for political, 
econonic, cultural, and sociological changes through v\iiich Japan 
emerged as a modem state. ^ 
The year 1868 witnessed the abolition of feudalism, an 
institution which had kept the Japanese econcxry in a low-level equi- 
librium trap; during the last 150 years of \\hich Japan's population, 
2 
incone, and capital had remained constant. 
Since 1868, Japan has displayed a very strong propensity for 
rapid growth. In addition to the abolition of the feudal regime, a 
number of factors may be cited as having contributed to the transition 
of the econoiy — from one so backward as to be indistinguishable from 
the other backward nations of Asia, to the position of being the sole, 
highly industrialized country of the world. Of these factors, three 
have played a crucial role in the transition: (1) the agricultural 
sector was able to produce food, foreign exchange, capital, manpower, 
and thus created the base for industrialization; (2) a large population 
with a high level of education provided an abundant labor force of high 
quality; and (3) a high rate of saving made capital investment available 
for labor's utilization. 
^ A modem state possess the following characteristics: capital accumu- 
lates at an increasing rate, population expands, and econonty as a whole 
(enploynent and national income in terms of its components) grows while 
growth of secondary and tertiary sectors is fast enough to transfer 
labor from the primary sector to these sectors. 
2 This issue is discussed in Qiapter I and V. 
2 
Throughout her itiodem history, Japan's econaiy was subject 
to nany erratic fluctuations; the most striking of which resulted 
from the outbreak of the Second Vforld War, During this War, Japan — 
already a world power — lost 25 percent of her national wealth, 40 
percent of her capital stock, 2.8 million of her inhabitants, and 
almost all of her ocean-going fleet.^ In addition, not only did she 
lose all of her colonial possessions, she herself becana subjugated 
to the Allied Powers. 
After the War, Japan once again began to resune her economic 
development. The Korean War (1950 - 52) provided a strong stimulus to 
the regeneration of the Japanese econary. That is, the reconstruction 
of the economy accelerated under the indirect influence of this War. 
Japan's recovery has been rightly called "the miracle of the post-war 
2 
world". The gross national product (GNP) rose at an unprecendentedly 
high rate and her total output surpassed that of many, highly industri- 
. . . 3 
alized, countries. Since 1968, the centennial of the Restoration, she 
has possessed the third highest GNP of the world — after the United States 
Discussed in Chapter II. 
A phrase used by the observers of Japan's economic history - such as 
M. Bronfenbrenner, in his article, "Economic Miracles and Japan's 
Income Doubling Plan", in W.W. Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic 
Enteirprise in Japan, (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1965); 
and K. Ohkawa and H. Rosovsky in their book, Japanese Economic Growth, 
(Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1973). 
The events which followed the year 1868 established the return of the 
new government to a direct public reliance on the supreme authority of 
the emperor; to this extent a "restoration" had taken place, John 
Whitney Hall, Japan - From Prehistory to Modem Time, (New York; 
Delacoirte Press, 1970), pp. 265-72. 
3 
of America, and the Soviet Union. With a population of over 114 million 
and a national income exceeding $642.8 billion, the Japanese economy' 
rivals the advanced countries in both her productive power and in her 
o 
commanding role in world markets. 
Profound changes have taken place in all phases of Japanese (^ 
V; 
national and individual life over the past century; political, economic, 
cultural, and social. This study examines the progress recorded by 
Japan in her economic life and attempts to shed some light on the under- 
lying causes of this unique record. With this objective, in Part One, 
after reviewing the historical background of Japan during the Tokugawa 
Rule (1603 - 1868), an attempt will be nede to examine the economic 
history of modem Japan after the Restoration of 1868. Part II will try 
to identify the factors of major importance in relation to the phenomenal 
growth of the Japanese economy. We will then discuss the following: 
(1) the significance of agriculture; (2) characteristics of labor 
market; and (3) the leading role of investment. The study also traces 
the impact of rapid growth on the economic and social welfare of the 
Japan^e people. This is the subject of J^pendix II. 
4 
PART ONE 
GENERAL VIEW OF TEE ECONayiy 
CEIAPTER I: HISTORICAL REVIEW 
While 1868, the year of the Meiji Restoration marks the 
beginning of the modem period of Japanese history, the two hundred 
years that preceded it witnessed many changes that prepared Japan 
for modernization and rapid growth. Hence, some examination of 
Japanese history during the Tokugawa Rule is necessacy for an under- 
standing of the circumstances which made possible the country's 
transformation after 1868. Such an investigation leaves no room for 
the hypothesis that such energy and restless ambitions leading to 
modernization came to Japan all of a sudden. 
Tokugawa Era (1603-1868) 
Isolation and feudalism were the two main features of 
Tokugawa Japan. By the "closing of the economy'V decree issued by 
1 
the Shogun (referring to the Tokugawa administrator) in 1637 
foreigners were not permitted to live in Japan — the decree lasted 
for more than two centuries. Trade, travel, and study abroad were 
terminated and made inaccessible to Japanese citizens. The minor 
G.B. Sanson, Japan, A Short Cultural History, (London; The Cresset 
Press, 1962), p. 454. 
1 
5 
exception was the trade with the Dutch and Chinese on the extreme 
South of Japan. 
Inside the country, the Tokugawa family, officials of the 
Imperial Court, ruled Japan; administering their government from Edo 
(now Tokyo) whilst the Snperor lived in Kyoto. ^ A quarter of the land 
, ^was owned by the Shogun and the rest was divided among approximately 
2 
270 lords. The numbers varied through deaths and feuds. The lords 
were obliged to maintain an alternate residence in the capital city 
(Edo) where they had to spend seme part of the year participating in 
special and costly ceremonies and regularly attend the Shogunal court. 
Their families were kept in Edo as hostages when they returned to their 
3 
provincial estates. The movement of lords with their people contri- 
buted to the development of roads, inns, restaurants and other services 
related to travelling. 
leyasu, the first Shogun who won supremacy for his family by 
defeating a coalition of his opponents, did not eliminate the 
Imperial Court and the Elnperor. Rather, he assumed the military 
and financial control of the count2:y as a hereditary prerogative 
for his family, and left a few purely formal and ceremonial 
prerogatives to the Emperor — such as appointment of the Shogun 
and certain other officers of the state. For this and other 
historical aspects of this period, see Ibid., p. 433-63, and 
H. Pratt, Japan — Where Ancient Loyalties Survive, (American 
Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1937), pp. 62-80. 
Sansem, op.cit., p. 466. 
A part of these people were samurai who were largely a parasitic 
class, serving as feudal administrators, and were forbidden to 
participate in agriculture or commerce. 
3 
6 
In spite of isolation and the traditional nature of the 
econany, Tokugawa Japan was not a primitive society. Except at the 
end^of the period, the Tokugawa Government was efficient in admini- 
stering Bdb, Kyoto, and Osaka which were among the largest cities in 
the world and which were under direct Tokugawa control. Thirty million 
people^were supported despite scarcity of fertile land. Houses were 
usually well-designed^ and satisfied the people’s needs. The standard 
of hygiene was high ccnpared to European nations. During this period, 
Japan started the quest for a literate, self-conscious citizenry. It 
is estimated that 40 to 50 percent of Japan's males and 10 to 15 percent 
2 
of the females were literate at the time the Meiji Restoration began. 
Toward the end of the Tokugawa Rule, roughly 70 to 80 percent 
of the people were classified as peasants. This crudely reveals a 
type of society of a low level of income per capita. Although peasantry 
produced a Icurge surplus above subsistance, it had to pay a substantial 
proportion of its produce as rent to landlords and to meet its other 
feudal obligations. 
Bearing in mind that technology was backward, the econcmy was 
busy in the production of rice, textiles, copper goods, paper, tea, 
3 
handicrafts, and traditionsl drugs. The market sector of the econat^ 
Estimate for 1860. 
This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
A. Maddison, Econcmic Growth in Japan and the U.S.S.R. (london: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1969), p. 6, 
7 
was relatively large with a developed financial system by Asian 
1 2 
standards. Money had replaced rice as the medium of exchange. 
Agricultural technology was traditional; that is, with labor intensive 
methods, it depended on the skill of individual workers for gains 
in productivity while fixed capital was a minor element in the pro- 
3 
duction function. Units of production were small, and yields were 
well below their potential level even in terms of existing practices. 
Toward the end of the period, the social and economic 
condition bec:ame increasingly more difficult. Financial difficulties 
of the Shogun, indebtedness of the lords to merchants, increasing 
number of peasants' revolts, and major rivalries between the Shogun 
and the more powerful and distant lords were some of the influential 
characteristics of the time. The major factor, however, to push this 
system to its breakdown was the intrusion of foreigners and opening 
of the econany to foreign trade through treaties following the forceful 
4 
entry of ComnKxiore Perry of the American Navy in 1853. Foreign contact,' 
moreover, opened Japan's eyes to her material inferiority. In order 
to catch up with the Vfest she had forced herself to adopt many techno- 
logical changes v^ich themselves led to further technological 
Maddison, op.cit., p. 6. 
This was achieved mainly due to exp^sion of market and comrtercial- 
ization of farming; see T.C. Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modem 
Japan, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 67-74. 
Slightly less than one hectare on the average. 
4 
Maddison, op.cit., p. 7. 
8 
improvements. 
The Tokugawa family ruled Japan for over tvo hundred years. 
These v\;ere rich, eventful years frcm the cultural and social points 
of view. In these respects, the Tokugawa society was traditional but 
not stagnant. Isolation itself had sane positive effects. It was 
advantageous to be isolated from enpire-building Europeans, and this 
created sources of inner strength and peace. In other words, isolation 
forced Japan to be self-reliant and made possible the development of 
indigenous enterprising talents. 
Yet, in spite of all these, when Japan entered the year 1868, 
she was still in a state of econonic backwardness. It was difficult 
to distinguish her frcm other econanically backward Asian countries. 
But as noted earlier, underneath the appearance of imderdevelopment 
the seeds of change were germinating in the heart of her feudal economy. 
See, for exarrple, W.W. Lockwood, The Economic Developnient of Japan, 
(Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 8-12. 
1 
9 
CHAPTER II ; MODERN JAPAN 
The lyfeiji Restoration overthrew the Tokugawa Rule and 
paved the way for the emergence of Japan as a rocdem state through 
a variety of far-reaching changes and reforms. 
The history of modem Japan can be divided into two eras 
— one lies before World War II (A), and the other after the War (B). 
Indeed, some observers of Japanese economic history claim that it is 
only after Wt>rld War II that Japan could be rightly called a modem 
state. While there is no doubt that after the War, the government, 
the economy, and the society underwent many dramatic changes, the 
period preceding the War was also notable for profoundly altering the 
pattern and pace of Japanese life. As best it could be said that the 
year 1868 is a turning point in the Japanese economic history. From 
this date Japan was set firmly on the road to modernization and 
industrial development. 
A. Pre-World War II Era (1868-1940) 
In considering the years before World War II, two distinctive 
sub-periods may be studied; (a) the period from the Meiji Restoration 
to the Russo-Japanese War, and (b), from the Russo-Japanese War to 
World War II, 
a) From the Meiji Restoration to the End of the Russo-Japanese War 
(1868-1905) 
The Meiji Restoration proved to be more than just a reshuf- 
fling of political influence. Rather it generated the momentum of 
10 
political change and of social and economic reform^ which, eventually 
carried far beyond the simple act of destroying the Shogunate, 
Feudalism was abolished, the lords were dispossessed, the samurai as 
a feudal warrior class was demolished, and social equality and freedom 
of individual movement promulgated. 
The ^feiji Restoration was neither a bourgeois nor a peasant 
revolution, although both of these features were found among the 
individuals who led the attack on the Shogunate. The leadership came 
chiefly from another source; from within the samurai class itself.^ 
These leaders had been privileged uniformly by a high level of education 
and military skill as they had already served the lords as diplomatic 
advisors and/or organizers of new military units. They came to power 
with the skill necessary for the task of building a modem country on 
the basis of an industrial economy. The Restoration thus marked 
Japan's transition to modernity, and as such, it proved to be one of 
the vital events in Japan's history. 
In the early years after the Restoration, the surplus funds 
that supported the government and built up the financial reserves, with 
v\hich new industries developed, came chiefly from the agricultural 
sector. Later, the contribution of this sector x:o the development of 
Japan will be discussed in detail. However, at this point it is worth 
stating that the funds generat^ed by this sector were used to build up 
There are a number of modem examples of groups dislodged from their 
traditional privileged position, gradually re-emerging • as ■ leaders of 
a new dynamic modem sector. The Ibo tribe in Nigeria and the 
Brahmans in South India are two striking examples. 
11 
social overhead capital in the form of railroads, ports, irrigation 
canals, and to inport technology for the establishment of industries 
such as cotton, textiles, and the manufacturing of military supplies 
and equipnient. The role of government in the initial period of indus- 
trialization was very significant. In order to build up an industrial 
state which would be able to sustain itself, it was necessary for the 
Meiji govemnoit to participate directly in economic activities. 
Since it was felt the merchant capitalists had no experience in 
managing certain fields of industry, government had to take the ini- 
tiative in building up railways, banks, insurance conpanies, a cotton 
spinning mill, a silk reeling mill, cement works, a glass factory, a 
brick factory and shipyards. Also, special attention was given to the 
organization and construction of military installations. Once the 
initialization procedure had been achieved, and the private sector was 
able to maintain the pace of industrialization and growth, these 
establishments were sold off to public at low prices. The one exception 
to this change in control was that the government remained active in 
heavy industries connected with armaments.^ 
Another surplus-generating activity was sericulture.. Silk 
was an industry which had its roots in the traditional village economy; 
yet it served a growing international need. Between 1899 and 1905 Japan 
produced more than 15 million pounds of raw silk annually, becoming the 
1 
Maddison, op.cit., pp. 22-3. 
12 
WDrld's largest producer of tha.t commodity. 
Next to silk was the cotton-spinning industry which eventually 
became Japan's second highly profitable industry.^ With the introduction 
of mechanized cotton-spinning techniques, the Japanese quickly adapted 
their labour-structure to the requirement of the new form of industry. 
By moving large segments of surplus labour — largely female — into new 
factories, industrialization proceeded without undue disruption of the 
traditional econonic base prevailing in rural areas. 
From a political point of view, this period carried some signi- 
ficance. From 1894, Japan entered into a new phase of international 
relations, a phase which began with her war with China and ended eleven 
years later with a military victory over Russia (1905). The 1894-95 
War with China marked Japan's coning of age in the eyes of the world. 
Japan was then able to protect her international security not only as a 
result of her dramatic political reorganization after 1868 and her skill 
in the diplomatic game, but with institutional and technological reforms 
such as: 1) the lifting of class and occupational restrictions, while 
2 
placing a burden on the samurai class, 2) revision of the land tax, 
3 
and 3) establishment of a unified currency and banking system. These 
combined to put Japan on a remarkable course of economic growth and 
provided her with the economic as well as political means of carpetition., 
Lockwood, op.cit., pp. 28-32. 
^ See Chapter V, p.99 and pp. 119-20, 
3 
Lockwood, op.cit., p. 14. 
13 
Moreover, these wars required entire national determination, effort, 
and patriotic sacrifice, resulting not only in the development of a 
formidable nu.litary machine but also in the creation of a nation unified 
behind that machine and behind its govejmment. 
By the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan became a regional 
power in the true sense of the term. She was new justifiably called 
"Iitperial Japan", possessing an empire consisting of Formosa — acquired 
in 1895 — and the Liaotung Peninsula — acquired in 1905. 
An overall econonic view of this period is contained in 
Table 2-1. From 1878^ to 1905, population, national income in real 
2 
terms , total and secondary industry's gainfully occupied population 
grew at average annual rates of 0.9, 4.2, 1.1, and 4.7 percent, respec- 
3 
tively. In 1878-82, 36 percent of the national income originated from 
secondary and tertiary industries employing 18 percent of the total 
enployment while in 1903-07 these figures reached to 55 and 33 percent 
respectively. The sectoral changes as such led to higher productivity 
of labor. Tlius, fran 1878 to 1905, both labor productivity and per capita 
4 
national inccme increased by 126 and 63 percent respectively. 
Data are available only since this date. 
^ 1928-32 prices. 
These figures are calculated directly frem K. Ohkawa, The Growth Rate 
of the Japanese Econoty Since 1878, (Tokyo; Kinokuniya, 1957), 
Table 1, p. 140, Table 2, p. 145 and appendix. Table 4, p. 248. 
These figures are calculated frem Ohkawa, ibid., Table 1, p. 140 and 












































































































































































































































































Therefore, it can be concluded that by the end of the 
Russo-Japanese War, Japan — politically powerful in the region — 
reached an economic level sufficient to be called a modem state. 
b) Frcm the End of the Russo-Japanese War to World War II (1905-37)^ 
The next distinctive period in the evolution of the Japanese 
econoonny extends from the end of the Russo-Japanese War until World 
War II. It includes the sub-periods: i) From the Russo-Japanese War 
to World War I (1905-1913), and ii) Frcm World War I to the outbreak 
of World War II (1914-1937). 
i) 1905-13 
By 1905, as mentioned earlier, there existed evidence that 
Japan had begun to move into a new phase of economic development. By 
this time, more than half of Japan's exports were machine made, consisting 
of cotton yam, cotton, and silk piece goods — compared to 1868 when 
2 
raw silk, and tea accounted for two-thirds of Japan's exports. Tokyo, 
Osaka, Yokohama and Kobe became the centers of new heavy industries and 
growing carntiercial and financial combines. A period of industrialization 
was in the making. 
Indeed, the Russo-Japanese War did not directly cause an 
industrial boom as did the previous war with China. But in due course, 
an industrial boom started with the construction of hydroelectric power 
This year is conventionally chosen because since 1937, Japan was 
involved in the war with China and World War II. 
Maddison, op.cit., p. 27. 
16 
plants which produced large supplies of low cost energy and thereby 
laid the foundation of Japan^s heavy industry. As such, industries 
like iron and steel began developing. The goveminent-established Yawata 
Iron Vfork, by itself, produced 59 percent of the total pig iron consurnp™ 
tion during 1906-1910.^ By 1913, all locomotives operating at home 
were domestically produced. The development forces further penetrated 
into the mining industry; hence, the coal output rose from 0.8 million 
metric tons in 1880 (1877-84 average) to 22 million metric tons in 
1914.^ 
Turning to Japan's international trade, the period was marked 
by sustained progress. Indeed, from 1880 to 1913 Japan's ej^ports 
recorded an unprecedented rate of growth of 8.4 percent per year, 
3 
unsurpassed by any other country in the world. Furthermore, the share 
4 
of exports in GNP increased from 3 to 13 percent during the same time. 
One of the policies of the government to prcmote industriali- 
zation was the provision of financial support to private industries. 
Among all supported industries, the shipping industry was subsidized 
the most. This was, of course, a deliberate government policy to help 
See S. Okita and T. Miki, "Treatment of Foreign Captial — A Case 
Study for Japan", in Capital Movanents and Economic Development, 
J.H. Adler, ed., (London: MacMillan, 1967), p. 150. 
Maddison, op.cit., p. 24. 
At constant prices, ibid., p. 28. 
4 
At constant prices, ibid., p. 28. 
17 
finance its rapidly expanding imports by means of building up earnings 
from this industry.^ Through this support, during this sub-period, 60 
percent of all ships owned by Japanese shipping carpanies were domes- 
2 
tically produced. And by the end of the period (1913) Japan ranked 
as the world's sixth largest merchant marine owner in terms of steam 
3 
tonnage (1.5 million). 
Therefore, the main character of the period between the end 
of the Russo-Japanese War and the outbreak of World War I was the found- 
ation, expansion of productive capacity, and hence the reduction of 
inports of some heavy industrial products. 
ii) 1914-1937 
From World War I to the years preceding Wcrld War II was a 
time of rapid growth. In fact, Japan grew faster than any of the 
4 
industrialized countries during this period , obtaining momentim for 
such a growth fran World War I. 
In spite of the impressive capacity to abstain frcm consuiiption and 
earnings frcm industries as such, for most of this period Japan was 
in need of capital. In this regard government borrowed overseas 
several times. This point will be extensively discussed in Chapter V. 
Maddison, op.cit., p. 23. 
In 1914, 57 percent of her trade was carried by her own merchant fleet, 
in contrast to India and China, where practically all international 
trade was carried by foreign shipping lines. See Maddison, ibid., 
p. 23, p. 29; and^Lockwood, op.cit., p. 23. 
4 
Ibid., p. 35. 
18 
The events which cxjcurred during Vforld War I produced sate 
positive econcmic results for Japan in the years that followed. Japan's 
co-operation with the Allied Powers did not generate physical daitiage or 
manpower loss. On the contrary, the War provided a stimulus which 
involved her deeply in the production of industrial irrport substitutes 
both for herself and other Asian markets where goods were no longer 
available as a result of the forceful withdrawals of trade from other 
sources. 
In this process, her share in the textile market increased 
markedly. Cotton textiles developed as the chief industry and finished 
textile products made in Japan became highly coipetitive throughout 
Asia as well as in other markets of the world. In addition, her shipping 
lines were increasingly demanded as other normal su^:ply lines were 
greatly restricted. All these activities resulted in the accumulation 
of vast reserves of foreign exchange for the country. 
By the time Japan reached the year 1920, the targets she was 
to face vsere those of spreading industrialization, mss political parti- 
cipation, and increased world involvement. By the standards of that time, 
Japan was now a heavily urbanized society. The total population had 
reached more than 55 million.^ Tokyo had grown to a large size, with 
over 2 million inhabitants, and Osaka to over 1 million. 
But the Japan of the 1920's had to adjust herself to the 
following events; 1) the 1920-21 world recession; 2) a mjor earthquake 
1 
Ohkawa, op.cit., p. 141. 
19 
disaster; and 3) the 1927 financial panic of yen overvaluation v\iiich 
held back the exports and diminished her foreign exchange reserves.^ 
However, Japan managed to help the export activities made 
possible by a greater overvaluation of the (Indian) rvpee and (British) 
sterling. So, she was able to penetrate into Great Britain's 
traditional markets, especially India. During 1932-33, Japan shared 
equally with the U.K. the Indian inport market of cotton piece goods, 
as coipared to 1913 vdien Japan's market share was 0.3 percent and that 
2 
of the U.K. was 97.1 percent. Moreover, by this tune she was able to 
inpose some discriminatory trade preferences in her own enpire. Thus, 
through a combination of these factors, the value of export in real 
terms rose by 70 percent between 1929 and 1937 — another achievement 
3 
unmatched by any other country. By 1937, exports of goods and services 
accounted for 27 percent of GNP; and by 1938, a high share (58 percent) 
of the Japanese exports were finished goods. 
Toward the end of this period, the consumption share of GNP 
was about 60 percent; and the rest was absorbed by the government and 
private sector for investment. Hence, seme more heavy industries like 
chemicals, metals and machinery, and large industrial units were added 
to the existing textile base. A great deal of demand for these products 
^ Okita & Miki, op.cit., p. 153 . . 
2 
Maddison, op.cit., p, 37. 
3 
On the contrary, during these years, France, Germany, the U.K, and 
the U.S.A. all suffered a fall in their exports. See Maddison, 
Ibid., p. 37. 
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was created by the govemnient purchase, especially thrcugh military 
expansion policies (approximately 16 percent of GNP in the 1930's was 
spend on the military). ^ 
Regarding the general functioning of the econory, figures 
in Table 2-1 disclose the following. Fran 1906 to 1938, annual rates 
of growth of population, the level of employment, and national income 
2 
(in real terras) were 1.3, 0.6, and 4.6, respectively. During the first 
five years (1903-07), 33 percent of the occupied population was 
employed in secondary and tertiary industries producing 55 percent of 
national income. Toward the end of the period, 52 percent of the 
occupied population was enployed in secondary and tertiary industries 
producing 81 percent of the national income. During the sane period, 
labor productivity rose 216 percent (Table 2-1). 
The general view of the econoty during the entire period from 
1868 to World War II can be summarized as follows: IXaring the first 
sub-period, Japan obtained modem capitalist institutions which, in 
turn, led to the impressive achievement of a growing econoiy unsurpassed 
by any other nation in the second sub-period. 
B) Post-World War II Era 
In considering the years after World War II, two distinctive 
periods may be studied: a) from World War II to the Korean War (1945-50), 
^ Ibid., p. 38. 
2 
See footnotes 3 and 4, p. 13. 
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and b) fran the Korean War (1950-52) to the present. 
a) From World War II to the Korean War (1945-50) 
World War II is believed to have had the most devastating 
effect on the Japanese econat^. It is estimated that Japan lost approxi- 
mately 25 percent of her national wealth and 40 percent of her capital 
1 
stock during this war. Furthermore, she had a loss of 2.8 million of 
2 
her inhabitants and her major cities were destroyed by conventional as 
well as atomic bombs. Internal transportation was disrupted, and the 
ocean-going fleet was wiped out — some had been sunk and the rest were 
damaged so heavily as to be inoperable. Former colonial possessions and 
overseas investments had been stripped away; assinred sources of raw 
material and captive markets had gone. In their place several million 
repatriates flocked back to the Japanese homeland. 
By the time Japan started to rebuild the economy she was under 
severe strain at her most vulnerable point; the inrportation of; raw materials. 
The country's prospects of economic recovery looked bleak, indeed. 
Japan became occupied, following her defeat and surrender. The 
calm way the Japanese people greeted the occupiers was astonishing. In 
3 
the words of Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky ; "...the Japanese proved 
extremely cooperative with the new authorities. There was no resistance 
1 
H. Patrick & H. Rosovsky, "Japan's Economic Performance: An Overview", 
in Asia's New Giant, ed., (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1976), p. 9. 
2 
Patrick & Rosovsky, ibid. 
^ Ibid. 
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and there were no violent incidents. Everyone joined in the effort 
to bring things back to a state of normalcy as quickly as possible."^ 
'The state of normalcy' was, in fact, different from what prevailed in 
the past. That is, the Occupation Authority brought some hard, 
restrictive, political and institutional reform under which the frame- 
work of the Japanese society underwent seme changes. Among these were: 
2 
i) land reform; li) dissolution of the Zaibatsu and abolition of 
monopolies; iii) trade union promotion; and iv) sharp curtailment in 
military expenditure to forestall any recrudescence of militarism. 
i) The Land Iteform 
In order to democratize farming communities, the new government 
implemented a series of measures, known as "the land reform", designed 
to foster owner-farms. The reform greatly reduced the proportion of 
total property held as tenant-land and sharply increased the number of 
owner-farms. The land reform, hence, provided the foundation for the 
vitalization of Japanese agriculture which had been stagnating for some 
4-- 3 time. 
2 
Large business trusts generally vertically organized through a 
number of industries and usually including their own financial arms. 
These diversified coi^^orate entities had evolved in the pre-war 
years around a number of powerful families, and the family head 
reigned supreme over all Zaibatsu affairs, 
3 
This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter III. 
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ii) Dissolution of Zaibatsu 
As these organizations played a doninant role in the Japanese 
econcxty before and during the War, the Occupation Authority was deter- 
mined to drastically reduce their significance. A series of steps were 
taken which included the freezing of the assets of ccnpanies affiliated 
with Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and other Zaibatsu; conpulsory transfer of 
stock owned by Zaibatsu holding conpanies and Zaibatsu families; and 
also a ban on the Zaibatsu family members' assunption of directorships 
in affiliated corpanies. During the occupation, however, the personnel 
running these firms co-operated infoimially as they were still mostly 
loyal to their old organizations. Maintaining the business in this way 
led the Zaibatsu reform to reverse, as soon as the occupation ended. 
Essentially, the Zaibatsu remain an important economic factor, 
although, in terms of ownership, having broadly dispersed their domain.^ 
iii) Trade Union Promotion 
Shortly after the War, by implementation of the Labor Union 
Law Japanese workers' right to organize themselves was guaranteed. 
By 1948, union membership rose to 6.7 million catpared to 420,000 in 
2 
1936, which at that time was the peak pre-war membership. But, 
since the unions were militant and some were under communist influence. 




this policy was short-lived as the Occupation Authority' themselves 
initiated a reverse course. So membership conditions became stringent. 
However, workers* conditions greatly improved through these actions 
and counter-actions. 
iv) Curtailment in Military Expenditures 
The most prolonged change introduced and inposed was that of 
the tremendous curtailment in military forces and expenditures. In 
the shorh-term, it left Japan with a high productive capacity^ vhich 
had no immediate peace-time use. Yet, in the long-run, it was beneficial 
as it freed resources for Japan to mount a very high investment effort. 
The conbination of military defeat, occupation, and the urgent 
desire of the Japanese for reform and reconstruction turned the post-War 
era into another period of headlong changes. The upheaval which followed 
Japan's first modem defeat was probably as significant as that of the 
Meiji Restoration. There are those v\^o claim that only after VJbrld War II 
could Japan be said to have become truly modem. And indeed, changes in 
government, economic, and social conditions after World War II were of 
such scope and variety that they clearly marked the beginning of a new 
era in Japanese econcmic history. 
1 
In spite of tremendous human and capital loss during World War II. 
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b) From the Korean War to the Present 
The devastation and disruption of World War II created 
massive problems of rehabilitation for the Japanese nation, and it 
was not until after 1952 by the end of the occupation that the econcray 
again attained its prewar level of production. Yet, while figures 
were conparable on an aggregate basis, it was clear that the Japanese 
econany was qualitatively quite different in 1952 from What it had 
been during the 1930's and 1940's. The serious dislocation which the 
War brought to the normal pattern of production and consunption, the 
frantic attempt of the government to tairper with and then patch the 
econcmic machinery, and finally the demands of the Korean War all had 
had their effects. 
Under the supervision of the Occupation Authority, an 
astonishing recovery process started in Japan.^ However, it was the 
outbreak of the Korean War vhich accelerated the process in a manner 
such that the Japanese econaty grew at a rate unparalleled to other 
nations. 
A number of factors may be said to be responsible for such 
an econonic growth. Wartime devastation had reduced the economy to 
such an extremely low level that the recovery process necessarily 
2 
involved a high rate of capital accumulation; this made possible the 
^ The development process of this period, specially the policies 
persued by the U.S.A, in giving Japan financial and advisory assis- 
tance is discussed in Chapter V. 
2 
For a detailed account of this issue see Chapter V. 
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intxoduction of advanced foreign technology; besides, it made funds 
available for research and innovations; and the plentiful supply of 
educated labor was pressed into service to achieve rapid production 
expansion. The upshot of these processes was a phenomenal rate of 
growtli. 
By 1952 the Japanese economy, as a vhole, appeared to be 
fully recovered from the effects of the War. Japan, no longer depen- 
dent on special financial supports from the United States but assured 
of military protection under the provision of the Security Treaties 
(signed on September 8, 1951 ^d February 28, 1952 between the United 
States and Japan), and freed from crippling military expenditures, 
began to emerge as a major world power as well as America's counter- 
revolutionary ally in East Asia. 
Since 1952 the new Japanese economy has expanded at a rate 
literally unmatched by that of any other major country. "The new 
capitalism" as W.W. Lockwood called it, as far back as 1965,^ possesses 
certain distinctive features vyhich distinguish it from the prewar, and 
particularly the wartime economy. Perhaps the most apparent evidenoe 
to the casual observer is the obvious rise in the general standard of 
living and level of consurrption. Clearly "the new capitalism", based 
on a vigorous and expanding "private economy" — "private economy" in 
W.W. Lockwood, "Japan's New Capitalism", in The State and Economic 
Enterprise in Japan, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). 
1 
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the pecailiar Japanese sense^ — is able to sustain its groftTth without 
the supports or distortions ^lich had characterized the period up to 
the end of the Occupation. 
More specifically, sore indices of the Japanese econatiic 
performance in the period after 1952 include a high annual rate of 
growth of incone, an increase in the level of ertployment, and a marked 
increase in the productivity of labor. A continuous rise in national 
inccane at a rate of 8.1 percent between 1952 and 1976 resulted in a 
five-fold increase in output during the period (see i^pendix I, 
Table 1). The level of employment grew at an average annual rate of 
1.4 percent acccnpanied by a 6.7 percent rate of growth of labor produc- 
tivity during the period. 
However, shortly after Independence, the Japanese economy 
ran into a serious foreign currency shortage. The sharp dwindling of 
foreign currency holdings led Japan to turn to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for the first loan. The reserve crisis can be traced to the 
internationally high level of Japanese product prices that emerged in 
Norman Marca writes that "First the Japanese like to say that theirs 
is an unplanned econcmy. But in our Vfestem terms it isn't. ..It is, 
...the most intelligently dirigiste system in the world today. The 
ultimate responsibility for industrial planning, for deciding in 
which new directions Japan's burgeoning industrial effort should try 
to go, and for fostering and protection business as it moves in those 
directions lies with the government." See "The Risen Sun", 
The Econcgriist, (May 27, 1967). See, also, B. Higgins, Economic 
Development: Principles, Problems and Policies, (London: Constable 
& Co. Ltd., 1959, Revised edition), pp. 631-33. Elsewhere , it has 
been mentioned that: "...over 90 percent of all government activity 
was devoted directly to looking after business." See J. Halliday and 
G. McCormack, Japanese Capitalism Today, (New York, London: Monthly 
Review Press, 1973), p. 165. 
28 
the wake of the Korean War boon tiined with the worlc3wide sluirp, and 
the increased import of food to make up for poor harvests at home. 
Eventually the crisis was overccme by a severe tightening of monetary 
measures, based on the balance of payments status aimed at maintaining 
the exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar. This was to be the base 
of econcraic administration for years to ccme. 
It was apparent that if the economy was to overccme its 
internationally high price levels and attain the capacity to sustain 
itself, the only fundamental answer was to elevate the productivity of 
the national econony as a whole and thus to lower production costs. 
To this end, the lag in industrial technology development created during 
and after the War years had to be eliminated and production facilities 
had to be modernized. Therefore a series of programs aimed at moder- 
nizing key industries was launched during the 1950's and was greatly 
supported by legal, financial and tax privileges.^ During this phase, 
frcm 1952 to 1955, labour productivity and national income grew at an 
average annual rate of 4.5 and 7.7 percent, respectively. 
Waves of innovations swept through the econaty frcm the latter 
half of the 1950's by a rush of large scale investment leading to iitproved 
production process, the birth of new products and industries, modernization 
of transportation and communication, and new developments in the energy 
sector. The final result was increased labour productivity, and lower 
1 
A part of this si±»ject is discussed in Chapter V; for a detailed 
analysis see for exanple, Patrick & Rosovsky, op.cit., pp. 11-54. 
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production cost which, in turn, led to a large increase in Japan's 
exports by strengthening their competitive power. During this phase, 
from 1955 to 1960, the labour productivity and national income showed 
an average annual rate of growth of 6.6 and 8.4 percent, respectively. 
•These figures were 2.1 and 0.7 percent greater than those for similar 
indicators in the previous phase. 
From 1960, a new economic environment emerged in which Japan 
increased her industrial conpetitiveness with her strong productive 
economy. One characteristic of this phase was that economic planning 
came to assume the nature of policy guidelines for the government. A 
plan known as income-doubling was conceived viiich was set to double 
the nation's income from 1960 to 1970. Actually, the idea of income 
doubling itself had come to the minds of policy makers sometime before 
in such concepts as wage-doubling or monthly-income-doubling. But it 
was in 1960 that the idea was finally incorporated in an economic plan. 
The actual performance of the economy through 1970, the target year of 
the income-doubling plan, averaged 9,6 percent in real annual national 
income growth, considerably better than 7.8 percent envisaged by the 
plan. Along with the growtii of income, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
also increased at an annual average rate of 5.7 percent.^ But the 
high tertpo economic growth was beyond doubt. 
1 
Such an increase in CPI against the essential stability of wholesale 
prices is marked as Japan's unique pattern of price trends. (See 
Table 4-5). 
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What makes the better-than-predicted economic performance 
more irtpressive is that half way through the plan, Japan was faced 
with a severe down-turn which is remembered as the "1965 recession". 
In character, it was a recession of off-cycle fluctuation in plant 
and equipment investment, and it created an atmosphere of credit 
anxiety.^ 
The first task was to prevent the recession frcm gaining 
momentum. Ever since the "Dodge line" (discussed later) the philosophy 
of a balanced budget had been upheld as a rule that should never be 
bent or broken. However, in view of the severity of the recession, 
policy makers felt that the inportant target was not short-range 
financial balance but long-range equilibrium in the economy. So, a 
radical switch of policy in favor of deficit financing was introduced. 
For the first time in the postwar period fiscal policy was restored to 
a position of prime inportance in economic administration. Finally, 
the program to coonter the recession worked swiftly both in terms of 
actual econcmlc activity and econcmic psychology. 
After the "1965 recession", the econory moved into another 
boom phase. One inportant factor was that the country's balance of 
payments, \Ahich had basically swung toward a surplus from 1968 (see 
Table 5-6) ceased to work as a cyclical disturbance to the mechanism 
of high benpo growth. 
1 
G. Ackley & H. Ishi, "Fiscal, Monetary, and Related Policies", in 
Asia's New Giant. 
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The boon phase, however, came to a halt in 1970, ushering 
in a phase of disturbance which has continued to the present. As the 
1970*s unfolded, the distortions of high growth loomed large on the 
dcmestic scene. The pattern of national performance began a moderate 
shift from total coirndtraent to growth to a policy that combined growth 
with concern for such social goals as environmental protection, safety 
of life, and social security.^ Developments on the international front 
further forced Japan to reconsider its course of high growth. Global 
inflation and the oil crisis of 1973 had a decisive impact in this 
regard. The oil crisis touched off a sudden transfer of wealth to the 
oil producing countries with resulting balance of payment difficulties 
and worsened stagflation in industrialized economies. All these shook 
the traditional order of the international economy to its very roots. 
The Japanese econcmy, which is particularly vulnerable to the 
shortage in energy supplies (as is clear by figures in Tables 2-2 and 
2-3), was rent by dramatic price increases. Economic policy was success- 
ful in containing inflation as well as in maintaining the trade balance 
at a sizable surplus (see Table 5-6). However, in doing so, Japan was 
confronted with the most serious recession in her postwar history. The 
recession was most severe due to the prolonged application of fiscal 
policy designed to contain aggregate demand. Real GNP registered a 
negative rate of, growth, jga 1974 and industrial production fell very 
1 
This subject is discussed in detail in Appendix II 
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TABLE 2-2 . JAPAN'S IMPORT DEPENDENCE OF CRUDE PETROLEUM 
& NATURAL GAS (1960-73). 
































Source: Statistical Survey Of Japan's Economy, (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1975), p. 29. 
* 
Note: Degree of dependency is defined as the ratio of total 



















































































































































































































































sharply (see iftppendiK I, Table I). The general view of - the econany 
led to a large decline in capital formation (discussed in Part II). 
And, in fact, not only did gross danestic capital formation decline 
in absolute terms, but it also declined in relation to GNP, from 
1 
40.7 percent in 1973 to 37,3 in 1974, Additional reasons for the 
large decline in industrial production were a considerable rise in 
the prices of raw materials, the provision of employment adjustment 
grants to firms, and large accumulation of inventories; all ccmbined 
to make it easier for firms to cut down industrial production fran 
the point of view of the profit-loss account. 
In recent times, public works expenditure have been again 
on the increase ani business has shown a strong tendency to raise 
prices. Therefore, if the Japanese nation is to restore orderly 
growth, a substantial expansion of production will be necessary if 
inflation is not to be reignited. 
1 
Statistical Survey of Japan’s Economy, 1975. (Japan; Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs), 
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PART 1W0 
FACTORS FOR ECONCMIC DEVELOPMENT 
A ccsyibiiiation of various factors can explain the rapid growth of 
the Japanese econotty’ since the Meiji Restoration. Different studies 
suggest different factors (or groups of factors). William Lockwood^, for 
exanple, suggests; technology, capital, foreign trade, and structural 
2 
changes. According to Angus Maddison the contributing factors are; 
technical assistance frcm abroad, education, diffusion and development of 
an appropriate agricultural technology, industrial structure and industrial 
technology appropriate to a labor surplus situation, research, foreign 
3 
trade, and investment. Edward Denison and William Chung , in dealing 
with the period after the Second World War, enphasize the role of 
factor input (capital and labor) on the one hand; and the role of 
advances in technological and managerial knowledge, better allocation of 
resources, and econanies of scale on the other. 
4 
Studies are numerous , each applying a model \«iiich is, or may 
look different frcm the others. Nevertheless, all of them have in cormon 
W.W.Lockwood, The Econcmic Development of Japan, op. cit. 
2 
A. Maddison, "Japanese Econcmic Performance", Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro Quarterly Review, (Decenber 1965), 299-354. 
3 
E.F.Denison and W.K.Chung, How Japan*s Econcary Gr^ So Fast; The 
Sources of Postwar Expansion, (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings 
Institution, 1976). 
4 
In addition to three studies above see also S. Okita, Causes and 
Problems of Rapid Growth in Postwar Japan, (Japan Econcmic Research 
Center, 1967); and G.C.Allen, "The Causes of Japan's Econcmic Growth", 
The Three Banks Review, No. 55, (1962), 3-21. 
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several factors of major iitportanoe for the phenonenalLy rapid grov^rth of the 
Japanese econcity: a high rate of capital accumulation, and the peculiar 
characteristics of Japan's labor market. Furthermore, the significance 
of the agricultural sector at the outset of modernization has been 
erphasized by many of these studies.^ This is because this sector played 
a veiy dynamic role in the early stages of modernization. It was through 
2 
the expansion of this sector that labor found sufficient cpportunities to 
work, and adequate surplus was generated to support other sectors of the 
™ 3 econot^. 
Aside frcm different models applied to explain the growth, there 
does not seen to exist any major controversy in respect to sources of 
growth except for the influence of foreign trade. To clarify, there is a 
4 
widely prevailing view that Japan's poor natural resources and strong 
population pressure have created a situation in which foreign trade has 
See references in the footnotes to Chapter III. 
This expansion took place through modest but pervasive innovations that 
required no radical departure frcm traditional modes of production 
(discussed in Chapter III). 
See Chapter V for transfer of surplus frcm agricultural sector to non- 
agricultural sector. 
Indicated by works such as: A.Maddison, "Japanese Economic Performance"; 
G.C.Allen, "The Causes of Japan's Econcmic Growth"; L.Hollerman,"Foreign 
Trade in Japan's Economic Transition"; in I.Frank, ed.. The Japanese 
Econaty in International Perspective, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University, 1975), and also 
K.K.Kurihara, The Growth Potential of the Japanese Economy, (Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins Press, 1971); T.R.Kershner, Japan's Foreign Trade, 
(Lexington, Mass.: D.C.Heath, 1975). 
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been paramount and the drive for foreign markets has been the prime 
mover of Japan's industrialization, but this is not borne out by the 
facts. It is true that during the 1920*s and 1930*s, \dien world trade 
was stagnant, Japan^s export expansion appeared particularly spectacular, 
supported by its aggressive drive for foreign markets. However, the 
entire record of a century shows that the degree of Japan's dependence 
on foreign trade has been low (^^pendix I, Table 2), Japan's rapid rate 
of trade expansion is not the result of a special drive for foreign 
markets but rather a natural outcome of her faster rate of industrialization 
as corpared with Western Countries,^ 
This part therefore will shed sane light on the role played 
by the vitality of the agricultural sector (Chapter III), special 
characteristics of the labor market (Chapter IV), and the rate and 
magnitude of investment (Chapter V). This does not, of course, imply 
the insignificance of other factors, and references are made to them 
where necessary. 
Supporting this thesis are works such as: K, Ohkawa and H. Rosovsky, 
Japanese Economic Growth; E,F.Denison and W.K.Chung, How Japan's 
Economy Grew So Fast; L.B.Krause and S. Sekiguchi, "Japan and the 
World Econoit^", in H. Patrick, and H. Rosovsky, eds., Asia's New 
Giant, A.Boltho, Japan ~ An Economic Survey (1953 - 1973); qp. cit., 
W.W.Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan; and A.Akaraatsu, 
"A Theory of Unbalanced Growth in the World Economy", Weltwirtschaflliches 
Archive, Band.86, Heft 2, 1961. 
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CHAPTER III; SIGNIFICANCE OF AGRICULTURE 
Specific attention is given in this chapter to the pattern of 
developnent of the agricultural sector and its contribution to the growth 
of the Japanese economy'. Agriculture was a crucial factor which led to 
the econotiic breakthrough in the nineteenth centxary and created the ground 
for sustained rapid growth thereafter. The agricultural sector contri- 
buted to growth in the following directions: it supplied food; it earned 
foreign exchange; it was the source of capital and manpower; and thus it 
laid the ground for industrialization. 
The pattern of agricultural progress, however, varied frcm time 
to time. During the Tokugawa period it is safe to assume that traditional 
agricultural technology had reached a level of production v^ich was as high 
as that of any other area in East Asia.^ When development began, agri- 
2 
culture was tiie least backward sector vdiich required the least transformation. 
During the Meiji Rule, the agricultural sector developed rapidly due to 
the availability of labor and un-utilized land, better irrigation and 
drainage facilities, superior seeds, better methods of crop cultivation, 
and increased input of manures and fertilizers. By the end of World War I, 
these sinple methods, using little capital, had been fully exploited. 
With the slack taken up, and in the absence of institutional changes, 
further growtlri was retarded in the agricultural sector. This situation 
T.C. Staith, The Agrarian Origin of Modem Japan, (Stanford, Cal.: 
Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 87-107. 
H. Rosovsky, Capital Formation is Japan (1868-1940), (New York: The 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 63. 
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lasted until the early post-'Viforld Vlar II pericxi. At this tme, land 
refom accaipanied by additional changes took place vhich eventually 
saved the sector from more retardation. At present, Japan still shares 
with the rest of East Asia an intensity of farming based on a large 
input of labor and small scale units. But the Japanese farmer 
with elaborate irrigation, heavy use of chonical fertilizer and 
mechanization has been able to modernize his farming practices to 
an extent still unknown in neighbouring countries. 
In the above context, therefore, the pattern of development 
and the econcmic significance of the agricultural sector will be 
analysed in three periods; the first period, fran the Meiji Restoration 
(1868) to the end of World War I (conventionally 1917); the second 
period, from the end of Wbrld W^ I to World War II (1940); and the 
third period frcm the end of V7orld War II (1946) to the present. 
A) First Period (1868 ^ 1917) 
During this period, the area of arable land increased from 
4,769 thousand hectares (in 1878 82) to 5,862 thousand hectares 
(in 1913 -- 17), marking an annual rate of growth of 0.6 percent. Land 
productivity (defined as net output divided by amount of arable land) 
grew at an average annual rate of 1.8 percent (Table 3-'l). 
The agricultural labor force declined slightly frcm 15,573 
thousand in 1878 - 82 to 14,613 thousand in 1913 - 17, vdiich was a 
decrease at an average annual rate of 0.1 percent (Table 3^1). 
The result was the growth of agricultural product. Throughout 
the years of first period the net agricultural output (defined as gross 
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TABLE 3.1. NET LABOUR AND LAND PRODUCTIVITY, 
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Sources; Table 3-1; K. Ohkawa & H. Rosovsky, "The Role of Agriculture 
in Modem Japanese Econcmic Development", in 
Economic Develoranent & Cultural Change^ 9(1960/61), 
pp. 43-67; and FAO, FAQ Production Yearbook. 
1. Figures in parenthesis are rates of change. 
2. Calculated by dividing net agriculture product (Table 3-2) 
by agricultural labour force. 
3. Calculated by dividing net agricultural product by arable 
land. 
4. Figure for 1949. 
5. Average of 1971-72. 
Notes: 
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output minus intemediate goods) grew at an average 2.5 percent per 
year, while the growt±i rate of gross output was even higher (Table 3-2). 
This growth was higher than the growth of population (1.1 percent per 
annum), so that agricultural output per capita increased. 
The above discussion reveals that, for increasing the level of 
output, gain in the productivity of land and labor was more important 
than the expansion of the land and the extraction of labor from farms. 
The ccnparison also reveals that some iirproveraent in land saving and 
labor-saving techniques was achieved during this period. With minor 
attention toward mechanization of the farms, these improvements required 
little fixed investment. This point needs further clarification. 
The increase in output and productivity took place in the 
traditional pattern of rural organization inherited mainly frcm the 
Tokugawa period, a pattern v^ich consisted of traditionally srnall family 
farms of about one hectare per household on the average, the transfer 
of high rent in kind frcm tenant to landlord, a regular supply of labor (equal 
to the natural increase of the farm population) frcm the agricultural to 
the industrial sector, and an extremely low expenditure for machinery 
and equipnent.^ There were two main factors responsible for inprovements 
in agriculture. The first was land improvement^ including better irrigation 
and drainage facilities and the reclamation of seme arable land T-. mostly 
paddy rice fields. The second was the utilization of superior seeds, 
2 
application of better methods of crop cultivation , and increased input 
R.P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan, (London; Oxford University Press, 1959) 
pp. 3-23. 
This was mainly initiated by the goveimment which provided instructors who 
travelled around the country offering guidance to the less experienced 
farmers. At the beginning seme attempts were made in direct imitation 
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of manure and fertilizers. The latter group of technological advance 
did not require investment in fixed capital like machinery or livestock. 
Rather, increases in working, captial, viiich were within the reach of the 
small family unit, accomplished the task.^ The first group, however, 
required fixed capital investment that small farmers were unable to 
2 
provide. Part of this investment was provided by government as part of 
social overhead capital; and part of it was supplied by landlords. The 
incentive for landlords was that the rent was high and although in some 
cases it was nominally fixed over the period of one to five years, it 
tended to fluctuate in accordance with the yield and estimation of coming 
3 
harvest. A further stimulus was that the terms of trade between agri- 
cultural commodities and non’-agricultural conmodities remained virtually 
unchanged (Table 3-3). 
The increase in agricultural output per capita also resulted 
in increased consumption as income rose. But a country like Japan, 
dependent on imports of essential raw materials, relied heavily on a 
of the Western technology by bringing in some foreign advisors. But soon 
after the new know-how proved unsuitable for many crops and many regions 
the government provided official encouragement for local initiative. 
After this date (1880) among the instructors there were more experienced 
Japanese farmers v^ose knowledge was mainly based on "what was good in 
the old" while "deliberately recorded and experimented in the conscious 
hope of making useful innovations". For these quotations as well as a 
good account of this issue see R. P. Dore, "Agricultural Improvement in 
Japan: 1870-1900", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 9 (October 
1960), 69-91, pp. 69-75. 
^ K. Ohkawa, and H. Rosovsky, "The Role of Agriculture in Modem Japanese 
Econcmiic Development", Economic Developnient and Cultural Change, 9 
(October 1960), 43-67, p. 50. 
2 
Although these activities were in major part labor-intensive as Rosovsl^y 
argues; see Rosovsky, op.cit., pp. 16-19. This argument, also emphasizes 
the role of capital in the agricultural sector as a minor factor. 
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TABLE 3-3 
TERMS OF TRADE BETWEEN AGRICULTURAL AND 
NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTOR (5 year average) 
(1878 - 1975) 
Periods 





















































































Sources: For first two periods, Ohkawa /-t.al.,p.l30; for 
the last period, FAO, FAQ Production Yearbook . 
Note : * Average of last three year . 
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domestic supply of agricultural produce. Up to around 1890 Japan was 
actually a net exporter of farm products.^ For the rest of the period 
under consideration, Japan maintained a high degree of self-sufficiency 
2 
for agricultural products. 
Aside from supporting economic development through sufficient 
supplies of labor and food, the agricultural sector provided a great 
part of the funds to finance other sectors of the econotry. One means 
of transfer was the land tax which provided 86 percent of government 
revenue in 1888-92, 63 percent by the turn of the centxury, and even 38 
3 
percent diiring World War I. 
Japan was also a producer of seme conmercial crops like silk 
cocoons and tea leaves, both of which served domestic as well as inter- 
national markets. These commercial crops — particularly raw silk — 
4 
were inportant sources of foreign exchange for the country. 
B) Second Period (1917-1940) 
The innproveraent based on traditional techniques reached its 
peak during World War I. Most fanners were already using greater quantities 
of fertilizer. Seeds had also reached a much higher level of quality. 
And although there was a government extension program to carry improved 
techniques to the farmers, it was not adequate to the needs of the situation. 
There was thus a need for introduction of new technology or other factors 
of production to maintain the rate of growth. 
^ Ohkawa & Itosovsky, op.cit., p. 47. 
2 
Ibid., p. 47? and W.W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan, 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 20-25. 
3 
For a detailed discussion see Chapter V. 
4 
Lockwood, op.cit., pp. 14-16. 
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This was a kind of knowledge which would have required more 
intensive consumption of capital, because land and labor utilization 
had already reached their peak. More intensive consumption of capital 
meant application of more inachinery per unit of land. But there were 
many constraints. The units of production were small; the man-land ratio 
was unfavorable! there was a growing tenancy among cultivators (30 percent 
2 
at the beginning of the Meiji period corpared to 46 percent in 1941) — 
(Table 3-6); rents were about 50 to 60 percent of the crop ; cheap 
4 
colonial production was ccnpeting unfairly; farm incone was stagnating 
vfcLle industrial wages were rising; finally, the collapse of the silk 
market in the late 1920's was a serious blow to the farms. All these 
factors created more than 35 years of agricultural depression. 
Agriculture shifted fron being a c^amic supporter of econonic development 
The size of the farm labor force and the area of arable land remained 
almost constant (Table 3*1); with population pressure and the inability 
of other sectors to absorb a greater share of the rural labor surplus, 
farms remained overcrowded; ibid, p. 59. 
2 
Dore, Land Reform in Japan, p. 17. 
^ Ibid., p. 17. 
4 
In 1918, the growing secular shortage of rice resulted in its retail price 
reaching a record high. The government had to embark on a massive irrport 
of rice (from Korea and Taiwan) in order to avoid dcmestic crises. But 
since the cost of production was lower in colonies largely due to the 
depressed standard of living, the coi^tition greatly damaged the Japanese 
farmers. The situation later further deteriorated viien a number of large 
harvests between 1927 and 1931 drove prices down to disastrously low levels. 
See ibid, p. 20 and pp. 68-9; Ohkawa & Rosovsky, op. cit., pp. 56-8; and 
Lockwood, The Econcmic Development of Japan, pp. 527-28, 555-6. 
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to a relatively passive position. 
During this period, the amount of arable land ranained almost 
constant while the labor force in agriculture moderately decreased 
(Table 3-1). The rates of change in the productivity of land (=0.8%) and 
labor (=1.3%) were slower in thi^period corpared to 1.8 and 2.6 percent, 
for the first period. The output of the agricultural sector, however, 
continued to increase for the period, but the rate of acceleration 
decreased by 50 percent (Table 3—2), 
The decrease in the growth rate of agricultural products, at 
a time v^en other sectors of the econory were growing at an increcising 
rate (see Table 3-4), resulted in reduction of the share of agriculture 
in national incane. On the average the agricultural sector produced 
51 percent of national incone in the first period and 27 percent in the 
second (Table 3-5). Furthermore, in the second period population grew 
at an average annual rate of 1.3 percent (cotpared to 1.1 percent for 
the previous period), widening the gap v^ch already existed between the 
demand for and the supply of agricultural products^. 
C) Third Period (1946 - Present) 
After World War II, bcisic changes in the circumstances of fanners 
brought a solution. These changes created favorable situation for the 
consistently desired application of mechanized farming techniques. First, 
of the most inportant postwar dianges which greatly affected Japanese 
farming was the land reform of 1946 that reduced the amount of tenanted 
1 
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SHARE OF AGRICULTURE IN NATIONAL INCOME 
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Sources: Table 3-4; Ohkawa et.al.,p.247, Table3 ;FAO, 
FAQrProduction Yearbook . 
Note: The striking difference between 1933-37 and 1946-50 
for the values of national income and agricultural 
products is mainly due to unprecedented inflation - 
i.e., the rate of increase of general price level in the 
post-war period was roughly more than 300 times the 
pre-war base . Besides,one must bear in mind that the 
drastic changes and disorder during and immediately 
after the war make a cotinuous observation throughout 
the pre- and post-war periods a very difficult task , 
For further problems related to measurement see ibid., 
pp.231-37 
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in Japaji Xrcm 40 percent in 1947 to 10 percent in 1950^ (Table 3^), 
Tenancy had expanded during the JVJeiji era \^dien rice prices were lew and 
many fanners were forced to sell their land to ineet high taxes. The land 
was bought by professional people and industrialists as a stable investment, 
\dio in turn leased it out at very high rent. As a result, unrest had 
grewn among the farmers and the Japanese were already feeling their way 
towards land reform v^en the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers issued an 
edict that this was to be done. A bill was framed by the Japanese govern- 
2 
ment providing that no farmer could own more than 2,5 acres (30 acres 
in Hokkaido), thus limiting the size of holdings to a very small area. 
The excess land was transferred to tenants, with government acting as the 
middleman, payments were made in bonds bearing 3.2 percent interest and 
redeemable over a period of thirty years. But, postwar inflation reduced 
the value of tlie bonds and raised farm prices. Thus most of the farmers 
paid off their debts in two years. 
New owner farmers, with no rent to pay, had been able to invest 
in machinery, irtproved irrigation and drainage and fertilizer as well as 
spend more on consumer goods. Simultaneously the government, following 
a pre-war policy of providing guidance for farmers, established agricultural 
research stations. These were to inprove farm technology toward a better 
understanding of soils, crops, fertilizers, pesticides, and toward 
bettering hygienic conditions. 
Discussion on "Land Reform” in this paragraph is based on Dore, Land 
Reform in Japan, pp. 16-20, pp. 129-48, pp. 174-98. 
2.5 acres is almost equal to one hectare; therefore the land reform 
officially stabilized the size of holdings to what it had been (on 
average) in the first period. 
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TABLE 3-6 
OWNERSHXP AND TENANCY OF CULTIVATED LAND 

























Bource : calculated from : R.P.Dore, Land Reform in Japan , 
TaDle 8 , p. 175 . 
Note : * Totals do not add owing to the specification of a 
small amount of land neither tenant nor owner 
cultivated . 
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Second, as a result of the destruction of industry and food 
shortages himediately after the War, there was a vast back-flow of 
population to the rural districts; but with a short delay, a reverse 
flow was established, vdiich was due to expanding alternative errployinent 
opportunities^ (Table S-^l), Decline in agricultijral labor force provided 
a rapid increase in the land-labor ratio during the post-war period - 
2 
at an average annual rate of 2.5 percent . This rate was achieved in 
spite of a decline of arable land at an average annual rate of 1.2 
percent; because agricultural labor force declined more rapidly at 
average annual rate of 3.2 percent (Table 3-..1). But in spite of these 
changes, Japanese small farms have been very labor intensive. As 
Table 3.7 indicates, in terms of labor intensity Japanese agriculture 
could be categorized in a group consisting of the developing countries 
like Sri-lanka, Egypt, China, and South Korea. However, this labor 
intensive agriculture is mechanized to such a degree that Japan, in terms 
3 
of tractors per unit of land surpasses the U.S.S.R., Canada, and the U.S.A. 
4 
In this respect she researibles countries like France and Italy . 
Discussed in Chapter IV. 
^ Calculated from Table 3.1. 
3 
One should bear in mind that data as gathered in Table 3.7 may not be 
internationally quite carparable due to different kind of technology used 
in each country; for example, different type and size of tractors, and 
different practices such as doi±>le cropping, and co-operatives, etc. 
4 
Needless to say, in terms of tractors per unit of labor the developed 
countries of Canada, U.S.A., West Germany, France, and Italy have 
far higher ratios. 
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TABLE 3-7 
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Source; FAQ,^Production Ye^bObk, 1972-76 
1 
Note; HA = Hectare Cone hectare = 2,47 acres! 
53 
TABLE 3-7 
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Source; FAQ,^Production Ye^bObk, 1972-76 
1 
Note; HA = Hectare Cone hectare = 2,47 acres! 
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Finally, another in^rtant factor facilitating the application of 
recently advanced jnethods in agriculture was the shift of teons of trade, 
between prices received and paid by the farmers,in favor of farmers 
(Table 3^8), That is, input materials including machinery, were available 
to farmers under favourable price conditions. Simultaneously, the 
market for output was beccming even more attractive. As inferred later, 
this advantage was privided by government actions on bdialf of the farmers. 
The iirportance of these changes is reflected in increased 
productivity of land and labor. Labor productivity, which had grcwn at 
an annual rate of 2.6 percent in the first period and only 1.3 percent in 
the second, grew 6.5 percent a year in the third period. The same trend 
holds true for land productivity; it grew 1,8 percent, 1.0 percent, and 
3.2 percent for these periods, respectively (Table 3*1). Net agricultural 
product shewed annual percentage growth rates of 2.5, 1.2, and 1.8 in 
the three consecutive periods (Table 3*2), illustrating a similar trend 
in productivity. A closer look at Table 3*2, however, suggests that the 
trend in agricultural production was reversed in the 1971-74 sub-period, 
as the labor force migrated out of rural sector at an unprecedented rate 
and sane farms became the sites of industrial plants. The decrease of 
agricultural product indicated that the increase in land and labor 
productiviiy was not high enough to offset the reduction in these two 
factor irputs. 
In general, as industry has been developing more rapidly farming 
\ 
has becane relatively less irrportant in the Japanese econcaiy. At the 
beginning of this period, farms managed to provide job-opportunities for 
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TABLE 3-8 
INDEX NUMBERS OF PRICE RECEIVED 
AND PAID BY FARMERS C1951 - 75) 



























Sources : Calculated from FAO, Monthly Bulletin of 
Agriculture and Economic Statistics ; and 
FAO , Production Yearbook . 
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51 percent of the total labor force^, producing 29 percent of national 
incone;' in more recent years they only gave esTployment to 14 percent of 
the labor force and supplied only 5 percent of national output (see 
Table 3.5 and 3^9). 
In spite of such a decline, Japan’s agriculture hais successfully 
2 
kept pace with the demand of modernization . Despite the scarcity of 
arable land, Japan's five million hectares cultivated area produces rice 
in excess of the demand of the large dcmestic market; not only that, it 
3 
also produces 40 percent of other principal food products’ demanded , v^le 
4 
the rate for general agriculture foodstuffs amounts to 74 percent . So 
far, Japanese farming has applied great inventiveness and effort to make 
the most of its natural potentialities. Probably no form of agriculture 
is more intensive than that which grows two or three crops of rice on a 
5 
single field. Japan has specialized in food crops - scarcity of productive 
land and large and expanding population requires that the land produces 
1 
Although seme of it took the form of under-eirplqyment as discussed 
in Chapter IV. 
2 
In this period, the net contrj±>ution of this sector to others has been 
positive, s^ K. Ohkawa and B.F. Johnston, "The Transferability of the 
Japanese Pattern of Modernizing Traditional Agriculture", in Erik 
Thorbecke, ed., The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development, (New 
York; National Bureau of Economic Research, 1969), p. 278. 
3 
Calculated fran M.D.Bale, and B.L. Greenshields, "Japanese Agricultural 
Distortions and Their Welfare Value", American Journal of Agricultural 
Econcmics, 60(February 1978), 59-64, p. 60. 
4 
Statistical Handbook of Japan, (Bureau of Statistics, Office of the 
Prime Minister, June 1977), p. 31. 
5 
As long ago as the Tokugawa period, double or tripple cropping had been 
one of the techniques to intensify the land use (Rosovsky, Capital 
Formation in Japan, p. 61). However, one should not overstate the degree 
of such practice - only for seme parts of Japan do environmental conditions 
permit the practice. For exaitple, frem 1903 to 1922 around 30 percent 
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TABLE 3-9 
SHARE OF AGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE IN 
TOTAL LABOR FORCE , (1878- 1975 ) 















































































Sources; Ohkawa et.al.,op.cit.; and ILO, Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics . 
Note ; * Owner cultivators are part of the agricultural 
labor force Csource ;" The 1960 World Census of 
Agriculture, Japan", FAQ,Monthly Bulletin of Agri- 
culture and Economics , 
of paddy fields had grown a second crop, J.I.Nakamura, "Growth of 
Japanese Agriculture" in W.W.Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic 
Enterprise in Japan, (Princeton: Princeton University Pressy^ 1965), 
p. 269. Present percentages are not known due to incomplete information. 
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maximum calories per unit. For this reason, industrial crops are not 
an inportant part of the pattern and industrial raw material which might 
be produced at hone are mostly iiiported. In 1975, for example, Japan 
imported total domestic demand for vraol and raw cotton, and 64.2 percent 
for lumber.^ 
The present record of food production and of self-sufficiency 
could not have been achieved without a heavy government protection by 
measures of tariffs and subsidies, (with world surplus sold in the world 
market at considerably lower levels? for exanple, sonething as much as 
2 
50 percent lower in the United States ), Farm size and poor soil make 
the economic use of labor difficult and do not pennit a desirable growth 
of productivity, v\hich in turn increases the cost of Japanese farm products. 
The high cost of production has resulted in high prices for agricultural 
products which, in turn, have contributed to an increase in the consumer 
price index. In this regard, the ceiling on land holding instituted by 
the land reform was modified in 1962 to allow larger, more efficient farms 
to develop. This has not been, however, a very effective measure 
because a fear of growing tenancy has not allowed for an efficient increase 
'.in the farni size.^ 
White Paper on the International Trade, 1978, (Japan Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, October 1978), p. 27. 
Bale and Greenshields, "Japanese Agricultural Distortions ..." p, 60. 
In 1976, average size of holding was 1,1 hectare per household. 
Statistical Handbook of Japan, 1977, p. 31, 
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There are argunients against the protection of dcsnestic farners^, 
2 
but a vote^oriented farm support policy does not permit liberalization . 
/^parently, the policy^ will go on because the Japanese government is 
imdertaking an ambitious '-CcKordinated National Food Supply Program" in 
3 
an attei^t to increase food self-sufficiency over the next decade . In 
other words, the Japanese government has embarked on a program to feed 
the population on more expensive donestic-produced food for the protection 
of donestic fanters. 
Summary 
Until the end of the last century, agriculture ranained the 
backbone of Japan’s econonic life. It produced 55.4 percent of net 
national product and provided employment for 69.6 percent of the total 
labor force on average. It was a growing sector, relying for its grcwth 
on increased intensity of use of land and labor rather than through any 
change in traditional anall-scale organization of production. 
This period of fairly rapid growth was follcwed after the end 
of world War I by a period of consolidation and moderate growth. In 
the years following World War II, the spectacular grcwth of the industrial 
sector provoked sane significant changes in the agricultural sector. The 
Bale and Greenshields (ibid.,) argue that the welfare cost (or net 
social loss) has been positive. Also see,K.K.Kurihara, The Growth 
Potential of the Japanese Economy, (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 16 & 57. 
\ 
To give sane indications, the maximum differential in the weight of 
urban/rural vote is 5:1; and fifty percent of Diet members represent 
rural constituencies (see Halliday and McCormak, Japanese Imperialism 
Today, pp. 170-71.) 




JOQst iir|X5j:tant of these changes was; the tremendous outflow of the farm 
population to the industrial centers resulting in the wide lase of machinery 
in agriculture. However^ due to the determination of the Japanese people 
to preserve, to the extent possible, the traditional values and non^- 
econanic benefits inherent in a large rural population, the institutional 
framework of small-scale and labor intensive agriculture has been retained. 
This has resulted in a high cost of production and a perennial dependence 
of the agricultural sector on a protected hone market. 
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CHAPTER jy 
ROLE OF LABOR 
The role of labor in Japanese econanic development inerits a 
systematic and separate examination. There are three areas of interest 
in the structure of labor market in Japan; 
A) The interaction between supply and demand - abundant supply 
at the outset and scarcity at present, 
B) Education and quality of Japan's labor force. 
C) Industrial relations. 
Section A deals with the quantitative analysis of Japan's labor 
market. In the early part of Japan's development labor was in abundant supply. 
But this situation gradually changed in the comrse of high rate of economic 
expansion; with the result that labor scarcity has been one of the probleins 
that Japan has had to deal with in recent years. 
Section B tries to explain that most of the qualities of the 
Japanese labor force — well-disciplined, skilly, and hard-working — 
/ 
are mainly related to the kind and amount of education that went on in the 
Japanese schools. Japan possesses one of the most educated labor force 
in the world. Therefore part of the phenonenal growth is explained by 
the education factor.^ 
For a good account of the existence of positive relationship between 
education and econanic growth see E.F.Denison, Why Growth jRates Differ, 
(Washington D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 196’/j, pp. 78-80. See 
also R.P.Dore's studies as cited in the footnotes to the above section. 
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Finally , section C will ma^e an a,tten^t to discuss tow 
Japanese industrial relations have contritfuted to the stability of 
enplqyinent within Japanese firms; and in this way to the growth of 
the econan[y. 
A) Iiabor; From Unlimited Supply to Shortage 
Fran the Restoration of 1868 to around 1960,^ one of the greatest 
assets Japan possessed in developing the country was the availability of 
a reserve am^ of unoiployed population, and a large potential of highly 
mobile labor in the form of an underemployed work force in the agricultural 
sector. 
Up to World War II, there was a gradual migration of labor 
force fran rural to urban areas; with the result that the proportion of the labor 
force in the primary sector was declining. With the exceptional circum- 
stances after the War — large repatriations from the lost errpire, and 
abnormally poor opportunities outside agriculture while the economy 
was undergoing rehabilitation — the number of employed increased again 
in the primary sector ahrost to the same level as around 1900, and by that time 
the proportion of primary sector in total employment also increased. And 
it was not till after the beginning of the next decade that the number 
This year is arbitrary chosen because', in fact, in 1961 for the first 
time in Japan's modem history the number of vacancies reported on the 
employment exchanges exceeded the number of job opportunities. See 
K. Inoue "Fran Labour Surplus to Labour Shortage Econory; The Case of 
Japan", International Labour Review, 113 (1976), 217-25, p. 217. 
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staarted to decrease. In this regard^ this, section is divided into 
two periods; one before the Second World War, the other after the War. 
a) Fran the Restoration to World War II 
The first figures for the labor force, those deriving frcm the 
Registration Bureau of the Ministry of Hone Affairs in 1872, show that, 
of a total working population of 19,179,000, the agricultural working 
population was 14,791,000 v^ch accounted for 77 percent of the total 
enplc^ed population (Table 4*1), By 1920, the total figure rose to 
27,263,000 — an increase of over eight million. While the agricultural 
labor force renained almost unchanged ,, at 14,848,000, its share decreased, 
in relation to the total employed population, to 54 percent. In other words, 
the increase of eight million eiployed took place in the non-agricultural 
sector. This transfer was made possible by the rapid ejq>ansion of the 
industrial sector which absorbed the rising labor force (42 percent 
between 1872 and 1920^) frcm the rural sector into the urban areas. 
The other characteristic of this phase was the increase in the 
percentage share of the occupied population in the total working age population 
(persons with the age-range of 15 to 59), so that frcm 1872 to. 1920 the 
2 
ratio increased frcm 80.9 to 88.1 percent . This was, of course, 
attributed to more job opportunities in the growing econcny. 
The detail on the exact type of enployment opportunities of 
the time are not clear, but it seems fron present documents that before 
1920 the bulk of this out-migration was into small-cottage industries 
Calculated f;ram Table 4-1. 
Ohkawa, et al., op. cit., p. 148. 
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TABLE 4-1 
PERSONS EMPLOYED IN MAJOR DIVISION OF ECONOMIC SECTOR 
C1872-1975I 








































































































































































































Sources: Ohkawa et.al.. The Growth Rate ... ;&ILO, Yearbook of 
Labor Statistics. 
Notes: 1 First year for which data are available 
2 The total does not add up since 2,243,000 workers were 
classified as 'others' 
3 Due to unavailability of data for 1945. 
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scattered alirpst everywhere in the CQuntxy , These were labour 
intensive industries (like textiles) viiich were established mainly 
to utilize abundant (and thus cheap) labour - to meet growing 
domestic and international demand for these products. 
In the next phase iron 1920 to 1940, the figures, for 
CTployment in agriculture slightly decreased (see Table 4-^1). However, 
the total increase of 5,762,000 in the secondary and tertiary sector 
could not all be accounted for by the out-migrants. frcm the agricultural 
sector. Seme came from the growing population in urban areas. 
A closer look at the Table 4^1 further reveals that during 
the 1920’s the increase was largely in the tertiary sector (85 percent 
of total increase), vrfiereas during the 1930's the increase was concentrated 
2 
in the secondary sector (91 percent of total increase) . This crudely 
See for example Lockwood, op. cit., pp. 18-42. 
2 
The changes occuring to different sub-division of these sectors are 
tabulized below: 
PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF EMPLOYMENT IN DIVISIONS OF 
SECONDARY AND TERTIARY SECTOR (1920-1940) 
Years SECONDARY SECTOR: 
 Gov, manufacturing Bldg. & Construction Private Mfg, Mining 
1920's 63 25 9 -24 
1930 *s -29 V -11 49 89 
Years TERTIARY SECTOR: 
Canmerce Transport. & Conmun. Gov't & Prof. Services 
1920's 31 19 15 
1930's ^ 18 23  
Source: Ohkawa, et al.. The Growth Rate of Japanese Econcary, 
Table 2, p. 246. 
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suggests that there vas also a difference between the two decades in the 
type of jobs available and taken by migrants from farm families. 
In spite of all these movements and developments, the overall 
rate of unenployment was very high. Unfortunately, studies on the Japanese 
labor market are lacking in data on unemployment before 1950’s^ and, there- 
fore, there has been considerable difficulty in ccmbining the available 
figures. In the year 1905, the first year for which derivation becones 
2 
possible, the rate of unenployment was calculated to be 24 percent. Ihis 
rate of unemployment had decreased to only 23.6 percent by the year 1920 
(the second year for which calculation is possible), and by 1940, stood 
again at 24.0 percent. 
Therefore, the characteristics of the Japanese labor market in 
this sub-period could be summarized as the existence of massive unenployment 
in general, prevailing underenployment in agriculture, and exodus of labor 
fron rural to urban areas. 
b) After Vforld War II 
The outflow of population from rural districts to urban areas 
was, however, reversed after World War II. The unemployment situation of 
the time with vast numbers of defeated soldiers, civilians repatriated 
frcm abroad and workers laid off from war industries crowding on to the 
labor market — was one of the worst in Japanese history. Most of these 
This fact is specifically pointed out in Ohkawa and Rosovsky, Japanese 
Economic Growth, p. 123. 
Calculated frcm data as given in ibid., p, 121; and Ohkawa, The Growth 
Rate of the Japanese Economy, p. 148. 
2 
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people were gradually absorbed into underemployment in the agricultural 
sector. 
This pattern was short lived; with the reconstruction of industry 
the situation returned to the pattern that had persisted in tjie past. 
There was, however, a sharp distinction between these two periods. The 
out-migration fron agriculture in the prewar period did not substantially 
decrease the labor force in the sector Cthis is reflected in both Tables 
3-9 and 4-1); it was the tremendous outf lew in the post-war period that 
finally reduced the agricultural labor force. The main carponent of 
migrants who left agriculture at an unprecedented rate was the new school 
graduates entering the labor force. Before the War, farmers with large 
holdings frequently kept their younger sons at hcitie up to ten years after 
leaving school to help with work on the farm. Since the War, younger sons, 
among other children, usually went to high school or university and right 
after graduation searched for employment in the industrial and service 
sectors.^ 
The continuous outflow of labor frean the rural sector was due 
to two reasons. First was the overcrowding of the fams. This contributed 
to keeping the productivity of labor in this sector lower than in the 
other sectors - and much lower than otherwise would have been the case. 
Productivity gap which had been greatly widened before the War continued in 
the same trend afterwards. Fran the turn of the century through the years 
1 For a specific account of out-migration see M, Namiki, ’’The Farm 
Population in the National Econoi^ Before and After World War II", 
Econanic Development and Cultural Change, 9 (1960/61), pp, 29r41. 
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preceding the War the productivity gap between the primary and secondary 
sector, and between priimcy and tertiary sectors had been increased 
319 and 283 percent, respectively,^ After the War, due to the higher 
growth rate of productivity in the non-agricultural sector than that 
2 
in the agricultural sector, the gap had become even greater. The over- 
crowding and low productivity of the farms had also widened the income 
gap between agriculture and the other sectors, with the result that 
3 
income in the former sector had fallen to the level of subsistence. 
Therefore, surplus labor was eager to emigrate to other sectors for 
4 
almost any gainful employment. 
The second was the absorptive power of the non-'agricultural 
sector; so long as the abundant labor was willing to move from traditionally 
low pay (either agriculture or small-scale factories) to modem high-pay 
5 
sectors, a ceiling to wage rates (or to wage increases) was set which 
Productivity is in terms of real product per worker in each sector as 
given in Ohkawa, et. al., op.cit., p. 20. "Gap" refers to absolute 
difference tetween productivity in each two sectors. 
See, for exanple, L. Klein and K. Ohkawa, eds.. Economic Growth; The 
Japanese Experience since the IVteiji Era, (Homewood, 111.; Irwin, 1968), 
p. 14. 
Ohkawa & Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth, p. 131. 
A good account of this issue is also found in Y. Mundlak, and J. Strauss, 
"Occupational Migration Out of Agriculture in Japan", Journal of 
Development Economics, 5 (March 1978), 55-71, 
Japan's labor market for long has been characterized by existence of wage 
differentials. While data for the entire period is not quite reliable, 
(because, the very concept of wage in something as traditional as Japanese 
faming may even appear questionable - at least for the early phases), the 
comparison between prewar (1938) and postwar (1954) reveals that the ratio 
of agricultural wage to manufacturing wage had declined from 56.7 percent 
to 37.3 percent; see Klein and Ohkawa, Econcmic Growth, p. 18. 
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had produced an elastic supply of labor to the industrial sector.^ 
Thus in this process, the primary sector supplied a great 
deal of labor force to other sectors. In 1950, of total erployment, 
51, 22, and 27 percent were employed in the primary, secondary, and 
tertiary sector, respectively; while in 1960, these ratios changed 
to 32, 38, and 40 percent; a sharp decline in the share of the 
primary sector's employment which conpensated mainly for the rise 
in the service sector (Table 4-1). 
This process could not, of course, last forever. The abundant 
supply of labor in lew-pay occupations, both in agriculture and in 
those technologically weak segments of the secondary and tertiary 
sectors, was soon absorbed. In fact, from 1961 onwards, a shortage 
2 
of labor began to develop. It is more appropriate to refer to this 
surplus which had so far been absorbed as "real surplus" because with 
32 percent of employment in the agricultural sector and another 
3 
reserve of underemployment in the industrial sector, there was also 
a "potential surplus" if the demand for labor was to grow. 
This argument calls to mind some features of the Lewis model for 
econonic developiient, A.W. Lewis, "Economic Developnent with 
Unlimited Supplies of Labor", Manchester School, (May 1954). 
See footnote 1, p.62. 
In 1961, about 40 percent of employment in industrial sector was 
errployed in small scale factories or workshops (each with one to 
50 workers), calculated from Ohkawa & Rosovsky, Japanese Economic 
Growth, p. 86. 
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Indeed the donand for lajbor did grdw7 not only that but the supply 
contracted too; and by these forces a great deal of "potential surplus" 
was removed,^ 
Thus , reinoval of the surplus was due to simultaneous pressures 
frcm three directions: the increased deftiand for labor created by the expanding 
econor^, a decrease in the rate at which the supply of labor increased, 
and also a decrease in the movement frcm rural to industrial sectors. 
As the share of errployees’ compensation in Japan's national 
income was low — the lowest among other industrialized countries (as shown 
in Table AJ2); and as the productivity of labor was still rising much more 
2 
rapidly than wages; the demand for this factor input was 
very high. On the other hand, the combined inpact of several causes may 
explain the drop;in the rate of supply of labor and its elasticity. The 
first cause was the human loss of the War which also was followed by the 
deceleration in the rate at viiich population grew - except for the "baby 
bocm" period right after the War. In other words, population which had 
expanded at about 1.5 percent per year during the 1930's, grew at only 
^ By 1970, approximately the same percentage (40%) stood for the share of 
erployment in factories and workshops employing between one and 99 workers; 
see Boltho, Japan - An Economic Siirvey (1953-1973) , p. 26. 
^ Ohkawa & RDSovsky, Japanese Economic Growth, p. 119, fig. 5.1. 
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TABLE 4-2 
EMPLOYEES* COMPENSATION AS PERCENTAGE OF 














































Source : ILO.Yearbook of Labour Statistics . 
Note : * Data for 1974. 
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1.2 percent per year since this date until 1962^. Secondly, the wider 
spread and longer duration of education was reflected in a lower labor 
2 
participation ratio (defined as total labor force divided by working age 
population). For exairple, the participation ratio decreased frcm 59.9 
percent in 1955 to 58.4 percent in 1960 ( declining further 
3 
to 57.7 percent in 1965) . Third was the iitproveraent in the agricultural 
4 
sector itself with the expected result that agricultural wages started 
f 
to rise absolutely since around 1961, and inore significantly they rose 
sharply frcm the same date relative to non-agricultural wages . Further, 
the government agriculture-protection policy made this sector 
attractive enough so that a high proportion (compared to other industrial- 
ized countries) of the labor force have remained on the farm land. At 
present, as Table 4.-3 indicates, 13 percent of eiiployment is in 
agricultural sector which gives Japan the third highest ranking in the 
countries mentioned in the table. 
IbO , Yearbook of Labour Statistics ; calculatation excludes the 
years immediately foliating the War . 
See next section (B) Quality of Labour. 
Ohkawa & Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth, p. 121. 
See Chapter III. 
5 
ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 
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AGRICULTURAL LABOR FORCE AS PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL LABOR FORCE FOR SELECTED DEV- 
ELOPED COUNTRIES , C 1961 - 1975 ) 
Source ; ILO g. Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics 
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Furthemore, v^ile forces of supply and demand were at work 
to produce a shortage of labor in Japan, a move to the five-day week 
started^. This led to a sharp drop in input of working hours v\^ich 
in turn decreased the rate at 'Vy^ch labor input was increasing and 
contributed towards tightening the labor market. 
The progressive excess demnd for labor is reflected in a fairly 
rapid rise in wage levels. The wage increase gathered speed after 1960, 
with the result that wages in the manufacturing industries rose steeply 
by 9.3 percent-a-year for the 1960-65 period as cotpared with 6.4 percent 
2 
per year between 1952 and 1960. The wage increases were, 
moreover, more conspicuous in the traditionally lower-wage sector — 
that is, small business and the service industries. This is an inportant 
consequence of the tight labor market. Smaller ente^rises and 
service industries had to catpebe with the larger firms by provision of 
irrproved conditions to attract the necessary manpower. This development 
is reflected in the contraction of the traditionally wide wage differentials 
3 
between the larger and smaller enterprises (Table 4.4) . 
It is not clear to me when'this move started. .However, it is not 
difficult to make an estimation. In Ohkawa and Rosovsky, Japanese 
Economic Growth, Table 3.3, the index as adjusted for man-hours> worked 
increased faster than the index for the actual enployment,in 1953-61. 
This meant that hours worked increased during the period. However the 
index adjusted forman-hours worked remained stable frcm 1961 and 1962 
(vtole erployment increased) and it actually declined in 1963 (the last 
year cited). In another source (Galenson and Odaka, "The Japanese Labor 
Market", Table 9.3) the rates of change of working hours are consistantly 
negative from 1960 to 1975 (the average of each consecutive five years) . 
Therefore it can be concluded that the above practice started sometimes 
in late 1960 or in 1961. 
Calculated frcm Table 4.6. 
The contraction will be less, however, if total earnings are considered 
as semi-annual bonuses and non-wage benefits are higher for larger 
enterprises, see Galenson & Odaka, "The Japanese Labor Market", ip. 
Asia's New Giant, op.cit,, pp. 607-9. 
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Of course, not all of the wage increase is due to excess demand. 
Sane part of it might be explained by: 1) higher productivity achieved due 
to increase in capital intensity in the various sectors of the economy; 
and 2) with the increasing levels of education attained by the new 
entrants to the labor force, there was also a corresponding increase in 
1 
the level of wages. However, as these forces were at work even in the 
previous phases, it is safe to assume that a large part of wage increases 
was due to excess demand for labor. 
TABLE 4^4 . WAGE DIFFEREOTIALS BY SCALE 
IN MNUFACnJRING (1955, 1961, and 1970) 
SC?iLE (No, of 
Ertployees) 
4-9 
10 - 99 
100 - 499 






Sources: K. Ohkawa, H. Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Grcwth, (Stanford, 
Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1973), p, 112, Table 4.17; 
and, 
A. Boltho, Japan - An Econcmic Survey (1953-1973), (londarx: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 28, Table 2.3. 
Wage increases induced by a shortage of labor could occur in 
any country, but it was particularly pronounced under the conditions of 
rapid growth in Japan. The rise in the wage level necessarily led to an 
increase in costs, which in turn raised prices, including consumer prices 
(Table 4-5, column 3). Fran 1952 to 1960, the CPI increased 21 percent, 
while frcm 1960 to 1975 it increased 203 percent. 
1 
For the relationship between level of education and entrance base pay 
see section C in this chapter. 
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Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 
* Figures in parentheses are indeces. 
Owing to the present depression the uneirployraent rate has recently 
increased (Tab].e 4-6^), but it seems that this is a merely a passing 
phenomenon and that once the eoonory has recovered the excess denand for 
labor will shav its face again. 
Finally, it is of interest to make reference to the 
Japanese government as an enplqyer, because the relative inportance of 
public enterprise in directly productive activities has been cne cf the 
characteristics of the Ja.panese econoty. 
In the infancy of Japanese factory industries \dien government 
enteiprise was of considerable irtportance the share of government errployees 
in total etployment was also considerably high. The figures for 1878 
As this table indicates Japanese econcity possesses a labor market with 
a very low unarployment rate in an international corparison. Despite 
shortage of labor, part of it might be due to Japan's employment practices 
such as permanent enplcymeht and seniority - wage system (while one's 
seniority is not transferable); see section C in this chapter. 
TABLE 4-6 
RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT (1955-77) 



































































Source ; OECD, Main EconomicIndicators 
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indicate that of total non-agricultural eirployrnent 22 percent were 
classified as workers in government manufacturing, and government and 
professional services^. However, with the growth of private capitalism, 
state-cwned enterprise became relatively less inportant. By 1890 
government manufacturing and services errployed 18 percent of total non- 
agricultural Qiployment; by 1905 their share had dropped to 12 percent. 
2 
lOuring the inter-war period the share slightly increased (to 15 percent) . 
However, as the government policy of the time required, a good portion of 
them were enployed in "turning out machinery, vehicles, and instruments, 
3 
mainly for the armed forces". For the period after World War II and the 
Korean War there is a lack of appropriate data. However, statistics 
revealed by the Japanese government indicates that in 1960, of total 
erployment only 3 percent were government eirplqyees and further it dropped 
4 
to 2 percent in 1975 . In spite of a low portion of government employees 
in total Qiployment, however, their role in the nation's econcmic, social, 
and political life is far more significant than the number suggests. This 
is because of the nature of their activities: they provide such inportant 
services as transportation, connunication, finance, and public housing. 
To sum up, an overall view of Japan's labor market reveals that 
the changes ^ich occurred in more than one hundred years were to cancel 
Ohkawa, et al., p. 245. 
^ Ibid., p. 245. 
3 
W.W.Lockwood, "The Scale of Econcmic Growth in Japan, 1868-1938" 
in S. Kuznets, et al., eds., Econcmic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan, 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955), p. 149. 
4 
Statistical Handbook of Japan, 1977, (Japan: Bureau of Statistics, 
Office of the Prhne Minister, June 1977), pp. 110-112. 
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the first three of the four adjectives - plentiful, cheap, highly elastic, 
and good quality, custanarily applied to Japanese labor. Of course, this 
is only natural, since one of the great benefits of industrial development 
is that at soonie point real wages are forced up. However, it is still true 
that cheap labor, vhich was one of the most inportant factors accounting 
for Japan's rapid growth and coirpetitiveness in the world economy, no 
longer plays this crucial role in Japanese development. 
B) Quality of Labor 
The quantity of labor alone does not adequately represent the 
labor force. The labor force is carposed of people viio are different in 
quality and efficiency. Therefore' quality changes in the labor force are 
of great interest for the study of econcmic development. Changes in the 
skills of the labor force during the process of econonic growth are implied 
in changes of industrial structure and of trade structures and may 
eventually result in faster development. 
Educational background is a crucial determinant of the quality 
of labor. It is the condition for and also conditions both the type of 
work an individual is able to do and his efficiency in doing it. In 
this sense the word "education" means much more than just ability to read, 
to write and count. Rather it is defined as: "moulding or influencing 
the development of: moral attitudes; intellectual capacity, techniques, 
attitudes or knowledge; and artistic or physical attitudes or skill — 
with the aim of equipping a person with: qualities of vocational utility 
for his latter life; qualities which will make him most useful for sociei^; 
1 
and qualities which are held to be of direct non-material value to him". 
This definition is taken frcm R.P.Dore, Education in Tokugawa Japan, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 34. 
1 
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However, it is sanetimes observed that grcMth in knowledge 
and skills, mainly due to educational effort is unable to contribute to 
growth^. Educating the mass must be accatpanied by an adequate rate of 
capital accumulation; only then can the educated mass be absorbed into 
the production process to increase the growth of the econoty, and newly 
acquired skills and knowledge can be preserved. Otherwise the outccme 
would be a tense, frustrated and over-educated society v\iiich, instead 
of contributing, would hinder growth. Therefore the term "knowledge" 
in the above definition of education must render the notion of "capital 
accumulation as the mainspring for growth" and the term "technique" 
must inply methods of acquisition and application of capital. 
However, since systematic learning through formal education 
deliberately influences the development of a child's abilities, knowledge 
or attitudes; and since methodological analysis of the link between what 
one learns and what one performs would be confined to each criteria as 
changes in the pattern of formal education, literacy rates, and enrolment 
ratios; this section is aimed at shedding sane light on these issues, 
a) Charges in the Pattern of Education 
i) Fran the Restoration to W.W.II 
By the time the Meiji Restoration began 40 to 50 percent of the 
2 
Japanese boys and 10 to 15 percent of the girls were literate. These rates 
3 
were much higher than those of the Western European countries at that time. 
The development'.of such a high rate of literacy during this period was attributed 
^ See for exanple K.J,Charles, and P.G.K.Panikar, "Kerala: A 
Cautionary Tale", Development Digest, 5(January 1968), 82-90. 
2 
Dore# op. cit., p. 254. 
3 
J. Halliday, "Japan-Asian Capitalism", New Left Review, No. 44 (1967), p.5. 
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mainly to availability of schools in 250 (out of approximately 270) 
1 
fiefs vMch provided mainly Chinese scholarship to the samurai class , 
2 
and also to the availability of about 10,000 (Terakova) schools vhich 
offered instructions in the basic skills of reading, writing, and 
arithmatic to peasants, artisans, and merchants. In other words, the 
traditional education of the Tdl-:ugawa era was not unifom, and was 
biased in favour of the elite class. 
With the Meiji Restoration*overall reform, specific attention 
was paid to the prcmotion of education as one of the necessary 
preconditions of the country's eventual renaissance. By 1872 the first 
national system of education was formed in Japan. Later, in 1886, four 
years of schooling became carpulsory (twenty-one years later, in 1907, 
3 
this ccrtpulsion extendejd to six years). 
From the beginning to around the turn of the century there was 
a planned unbalanced growth between primary education and middle-school 
'or higher education in favour of the former. As a result of this policy 
by 1900, 90 .'6 percent of males and 71.7 percent of fennales studied in 
primary schools, but for only approximately 5 percent of them did there 
4 
exist enough accomodation in secondary schools . It was in this way that 
V.N.Kobayashi, "Morale in Education and Social Development in Japan", 
Asian Profile, 5(December 1977), 509-17, p. 509. 
_. _ , ^ 
2 
Dore, op. cit., p. 253. 
3 
Maddison, Economic Growth in Japan and USSR, qp. cit., p. 16. 
4 " 
R.P.Dore, "The Inportance of Educational Tradition: Japan and Elsevbere", 
Pacific Affairs, 45(1972), 491-507, p. 491. 
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Japan was provided with the means to give the mss of people the 
enjoyment of receiving at least sane years of schooling. 
In the next phase (after 1900) as soon as the mission of giving 
sane years of general education to the nation was accotplished, a rapid 
spurt in secondary education took place. Therefore the Japan of 194C| 
saw 51.5 percent of all boys and 40.4 percent of all girls leaving the 
elementary schools enrolled in the secondary schools^, 
ii) After W.W.II 
After W.W.II, the Occupation Authorities, among other reforms, 
fastened upon educational change and established the present day school 
system. A standard six-three-three-four system was instituted in ^^hich 
the first two levels - six years of elementary schooling and three years 
2 
of junior high schooling - were made ccnpulsary . These nine years were 
open to all children of school age (6 to 14 years) and were to be free. 
Furthermore, under the new systan, and for the achievement of a 
higher degree of uniformity, a single coiprehensive type of senior high 
school was created. The new schools were to replace the several specialized 
types (ie., agriculture, canmerce, academic, etc.) inherited from prewar 
days. The previous system was permitted to continue provided that it 
offered a minimum national curriculum of general education subjects. 
In rural areas, hcwever, the creation of the new system was recormended 
side by side with continuation of the old one to meet the needs of all the 
youth in the ocanminity, whether they were heading for an acadomlc or a 
vocational career. 
1 
R.P.Dore, "Education in Japan's Growth", Pacific Affairs, 37(Spring 1964), 
66-79, p. 69. 
2 
Kc±>ayashi, op.cit., p. 510. 
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The enforconent of ^11 these policies in the postwar period 
has been very successful. The attendance rates for various levels of 
education have increased satisfactorily. By 1950, for exanple, all 
children of school age attended elementary schools and the percentage 
! 
for those attending secondary schools (only three years of which is 
cotpulsory) was as high as 70 percent and increased further to 81 and 90 
percent in 1960 and 1970, respectively. Enrolment ratio for post-high 
school education has also increased frcm 11 percent in 1950 to 17 percent 
in 1970 with a relatively greater contribution of females.^ 
An international comparison, as in Table 4-7, reveals that the 
Japanese people have received as much education as those of Northwest 
Europe, a bit less than those of U.S. and Canada, and considerably more 
than other countries in Asia. 
TABIiE 4.7 GROSS ENROIMENT RATIOS,^1970 



















































































UNESCO, Statistical Yecirbook, 1974 
The gross enrolment ratio is the total enrolment of all ages 
divided by the population of the specific age groups which 
correspond to the age groups of each level of schooling. 
N.A. = Not available. 
1 
UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1974. 
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Postwar ref onus in education also led to an increase in the 
number of post-high school institutes. Especially during the 1960's there 
occurred an enormous increase in the nurriber of private institutions, 
vMch grew rapidly to accomodate the increasing denand for higher education. 
The minber of national and local public universities grew little between 
1952 and 1975 (frcm 105 to 115) ? vhile the nunber of private universities 
rose frcm 116 to 305. The propcirtion of students enrolled in private 
universities grew frcm 57 to almost 80 percent^. Therefore, it was mostly 
the private sector that accormodated the increased demand. 
As far as the financing of educational expenditure is concerned, 
in spite of imposing a great part of the cost (at higher levels which are not 
oorpulsory) on students? Japan ranks high in an international corparison 
in terms of proportion of public expenditure spent for education. As 
Table 4*8, column I indicates, the highest ratio - 26.6 percent belongs 
to the Netherlands and that for Japan is 20.4 percent. However, Japan 
spends a very low share of G.N.P. on public education among cxxtparable 
developed countries (column 2). 
Statistical Handbook of Japan, (Bureau of Statistics, Office of the 
Prime Minister, Japan, 1977). 
N. Glazer, "Social and Cultural Factors in Japanese Economic Growth", 
in Asians New Giant, op. cit., pp. 824-25. 
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SoTjrces; UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1974; and Statistics Canada, 
Canada Yearbook, 1974. 
Note: * data for 1965. 
b) Education and Development 
So far, the pattern through which the Japanese nation became 
educated has been presented. However, the ceaitral point is beyond this 
presentation. Rather it is to find out how these educational efforts have 
been channeled to contribute to the developtient of the country. 
To analyze how the basic educational structure has trained the human 
resources so as to enable them first, to frame both political and social 
86 
institutions capable of development and second, consistently apply 
intelligence to evaluate these institutions so that none becomes the 
hindrance to development. 
As far as the first contribution is concerned, there is 
adequate evidence that education was partly responsible for the changes 
vdiich took place in Japan in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
The key factor was the high literacy rates: 40 to 50 percent of boys 
and 10 to 15 percent of girls were literate by the time the IVfeiji Resto- 
ration began viiile, the samurcii class was entirely educated^ . Yet, 
literacy of this degree had been achieved not force on an unwilling 
people; rather it was supported by parents’ voluntary choice and 
sacrifice. Parents themselves, therfore, were not rigidly tradition- 
i- 
I 
bound and were willing to raise their children in a reasonably free 
atmosphere, with less restrictions than would be expected in a society 
characterized by lower levels of literacy. 
The notion of self-irrprovement—enhancing prestige and self- 
respect— as well as improvement of chances in a material sense through edu- 
cation had been diffused. The wide diffusion of a basic literacy meant that 
Japan had a better chance, when the process of industrialization and polit- 
ical change began, of putting the nation’s best intellectual resources to 
good use. Possession of a literate population also had some political 
iirplication; that is, the administration by written directive could reach 
down to the lowest level of the society. The success of the 1868 Revolution, 
leading to onergence of a modem country, was created not only by a top- 
1 
Dore, Education in Tokugawa Japan, op. cit., p. 254. 
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level change, but also by a "cummilation of a mass of small initiatives 
by large nimbers of people vdio could appreciate new possibilities, make 
new choices, or at the very least allcw themselves to be persuaded to do 
for the first time something they had never done before”,^ Above all, 
the high rate of literacy also irtplied that once the Meiji Restoration 
took over and began its program of forced-pace modernization, its 
decrees ordering the establishment of a universal systen of elenentary 
schooling alreacfy had a substantial foundation on \diich to build. 
The creation of the national system of education helped increase 
the level of literacy yet further, and thus served a vital function in 
giving Japan the capacity to modernize and to gain popular acceptance 
of the basic aims of tlie state. For it was new official doctrine that : 
the nation had to progress and that it could only do so by mobilizing all 
the talents of individuals devoted to self-improvement, 
Miat was very inpressive with the new system was the kind of 
education that went on, as these schools established a particular 
pedagogical tradition in the Japanese culture. And since Japan had 
maintained her domestic issues in isolation frem the rest of the world, her 
modem educational systHii was not built around a framework originally 
devised to train the subordinate local members of a colonial administrator. 
Primary schools were established in villages which gave; farmers^ 
children the opportunity for general education. This was a kind of education 
so firmly in harmony with the tradition vhich did not raise the Japanese 
Dore, Education In Tokugawa Japan, op. cit., p. 294. 
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villagers "too proud to get the;Lr feet wet and their hands dirty" 
rather, it extended the technical skills, politics, and social attitudes 
required to reinforce their cawnitment to work on the land. 
Exchange of Icyalty, and paternalism in Japanese factories 
are deeply rooted in the ethics courses taught in primary schools of 
the first half of the twentieth century. One may even claim 
that the strong ability of the ^ole Japanese nation to abstain from 
consunp±ion and to save 15 to 25 percent of incane, has sanething to do 
2 
with the type of education that prevailed. 
The Meiji educational reform, therefore, greatly widened the 
prospects, for the people and for the country, by setting the seal of 
official approval on the ambitious educational efforts. Since then 
Japan has always had one of the highest literacy rates in the world. 
However, with the educational level so high throughout the history of 
modem Japan, education has not been so significant to appear as a net 
3 4 
positive factor in the rapid econonic development since the Korean War . 
Nevertheless, it has kept working well to acoamodate the needs of a 
growing eooncmy by motivating and mobilizing the population’s talents. 
It is, of course, an exaggeration to say that education is the sole 
explanation of the vitality of the Japanese intellectual culture and of 
^ Etore, "The Iiiportance of Education", op. cit., p. 565. 
2 
See for example Dore, "Education in Japan's Growth", op.cit., p. 74. 
3 
Because there is a negative side to more schooling as well. The declining 
number of those v^o terminate their education at the middle school level 
means a reduced supply of semiskilled factory laborers. 
4 
This is particularly claimed by; Denison & Chung, How Japan's Econany 
Grew So Fast, p. 38 & pp. 59-62. 
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her enterprise. Education is only a partial es^ression of a cultural 
tradition, as well as being only one of the mechanisms which sustain it 
and transmit it fran one generation to another. But it is an inportant 
mechanism. 
C) Industrial Relations 
The so called "paternal relation" between eitplqyer and enplqyee 
is believed to e^^lain the Japanese industrial relation system. Paternal 
relation means that, instead of trading work for pay or pay for work, the 
worker and eirployer are said to reciprocate "loyally". This, on the other 
hand, inplies both the obligations of the former to the latter and the 
responsibilities of the latter to the former. J. Abegglen, whose book has 
doninated the Western view of industrial relations in Japan imtil very 
recently, writes that: "At whatever level of organization in the Japanese 
factory, the vrarker canmits himself on entrance to the coipany for the 
renainder of his working career. The Cotpany will not discharge him even 
tenporarily except in the most extreme circumstances. He will not quit 
1 
the cotpany for industrial erployment elsewhere". In other words what 
it implies is a life-time cormitment for a job once one accepts. It also 
makes a suggestion that labor is a fixed factor in the short-run 
production function; vMle it is subject to "rachet type effect" in the 
long-run. That is, during upswings, as demand for output goes up, 
employment will increase. During downswings the opposite of the 
relationship is not the case. Instead, as incomes follow a downward 
direction orployment remains constant because the practice of life-time 
^ J.C.Abegglen, The Japanese Factory, (Glencoe, 111,: Free Press, 1958). p.l7. 
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cxnmitment prohibits orployers frcxn firing the unwanted laborers. 
Given the assurrption of life-time ccrrmitinent, within a firm 
the worker is paid on the basis of the level of education and age at 
the time of entry; and his wage is raised by so called "seniority". 
In other words, education and age determine the starting pay; that is, 
once one gets hired he will get a special wage scale with that firm 
depending mainly on vdiether he has entered as a junior high school 
graduate, a senior high school graduate, or as a university graduate. 
In each specific wage scale, base pay, fringe benefits, and retirement 
pay are scaled in such a way as to increase steadily with his length of 
service (or seniority). 
This system works depending on the fulfillment of a dual set 
of expectations that are deeply rooted in Japanese traditions and cultural 
norms. For the worker, there is the expectation that he will be able to 
stay with his chosen firm, and that he intends to do so. This intention 
is conditioned by the fact that he will be within the norm of Japanese 
occupational life and that he has a good deal to gain financially by 
staying on. For the eirployer, there is the expectation that the worker 
will stay, provided he is offered standard wages and conditions of 
employment. Social conditions and cultural norms inpose a sense of 
obligation on the employer, vho is expected to provide work for his 
Qiployees and take care of them. This system provides the employee with 
a sense of security. The probability of wage interruption due to business 
cycles is low. The arployee has a multitude of opportunities for training. 
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receiving new wage benefits, and upward mobility within the coipany with 
accatpanying psychic satisfaction. Monetary rewards are not necessarily 
associated with upward mobility or irrproved performance but are instead 
primarily a function of one's seniority in the caipany. At the same 
time, the performance of an erployee can be evaluated over a period of 
years. There are a few more advantages for an employer. This system 
increases the probability that on-the-job training benefits in production 
will accrue to the training firm; it lowers probability of indiostrial 
strife; and it also lovers turn-over costs. 
The concept of training needs further clarification, Anerican 
employers seen to be reluctant to invest in training that imparts general 
skills, transferable to other ©tployers, and more willing to train for 
jobs unique to the individual firm leaving the general training to 
vocational schools. It is generally recognized that Japan's govemment- 
. 1 
run vocation school system is modest . But neither does there appear 
to be an excessive expenditure on training within the individual enterprise. 
An OECD manpower team pointed out that despite a considerable volume of 
inteinal training, most of it was brief. In attempting to explain the 
Japanese success in skill formation; the team came up with the following 
conment: "Maybe the conclusion can be drawn that the special features 
of the Japanese ennployment relationship — the vhole system of consultations, 
social participation, informal training, incentives and motivations vhich 
See Beatrice G. Rubens, "Manpower Training in Japan", Monthly Labor 
Review, 96(Septenber 1973), p. 18. Rubens points out that 250,000 public 
trainees a year for a labor force of 50 million is not inpressive. 
Sweden, with a labor force of 4 million, had 94,000 students enrolled 
in government training programs in 1971. 
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exist in the indivicJual enterprise — make an ad hoc process of skill 
acquisition highly effective”.^' To have a precise conparison of the 
resources allocated to industrial training in Japan and other indxistrialized 
nations would be of interest. In their absence, it can only be pointed out 
that Japanese enterprises obviously have managed-Jji one way or another - 
to create the skills necessary to maintain their rapid rate of expansion. 
The origin of this system permanent eitplcyment and seniority 
based wage — can be traced to the ancient paternal relations of lords 
and their retainers in feudal Japan. In the course of industrialization, 
this practice was preserved in the family tradition of the old Zaibatsu. 
The bureaucratic structure of government and early state-owned enterprise 
provided another forum for the adaption of the system. Another element 
that added a fillip to this practice and institutionalized the arrangement 
in modem enterprise came into its cmi in the 1920*s, v^en the prevailing 
socioeconoTiic conditions made such an arrangement both feasible and 
desirable. At that time, firms began to find it difficult to hire 
eitployees fran other firms. To protect their own enployees from being 
hired away, sane measures were necessary since technology was becoming 
diverse and complex and enployees needed workers with more specific skills. 
The ideology developed its own independent momentum and reinforced the 
values such as morality as the essence of industrial managenent, and 
loyalty. After W.W.II, these arrangements were preserved in a more formal 
manner, and thus the present "life-time commitment" and "seniority- 
^ OECD, Marpower Policy in Japan (1973), p. 138. 
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based wage systan" were institutionalized.^ 
There is, however, a great deal more to the Japanese 
industrial relations system. Closer examination shows that 
the picture is more coiplicated than that presented by Abegglen.C It 
is also possilDle that seine iirportant ctianges have taken place since 
2 
Agegglen wrote his book.) For exaitple, Marshall's stu(^ reveals that, in 
its early formation in the modem era, this system classified the workers 
into two basic gmi:5)S consisting of regular or permanent and irregular 
or tenporary eiplqyees, and excluded the latter groip from benefiting from 
such a systan. For instance, these concepts were found as early as the 
1870 *s in the government-operated Yokosuka Shipyard - where the notion 
of "a wage scale with built-in incranental increases that rewarded 
3 
seniority over and above job-related perfoinnance" was germinating. 
Furthermore, the system was limited to certain large-scale enterprises 
4 
at least as far back as the 1920 *s . At present, this system possesses an 
even wider area of exclusion. That is, it is only applied to male workers 
but not to female workers, to more educated workers but not to less 
educated workers, to full-time regular employees but not to tenporary or 
sub-contracted workers, and to workers of large enterprises but not to 
5 
those of small enterprises. This leaves only 40 percent of all erployees 
^ B.K.Marshall, "Japanese Business Ideology and Labor Policy", in 
Columbia Journal of Vforld Business, 12(^ring 1977), 22-29, pp. 23-26?and 
Ken’ichi Imai, "Japan Industrial Organization", Japanese Economic Studies, 
6 (Spring-Sutrmer 1978), 3-67. 
3 
Ibid, p. 25c 
4 
Ibid, p. 25. 
5  
A.Boltho, Japan-An Economic Survey (1953-1973), op. cit., p. 35, 
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to benefit fron the system.^ 
The gradual breakdown of the system may be due to: 1) imionization 
(during Allied 0ccupation)f_,-2) tightness of the labor market reflected in the 
long history of low unenployment; 3) less opportunity to return to the farm; 
4) increased cost of providing new wage benefits; and 5) increased danand 
for leisure as incone has increased. 
Hcwever at present,one must not fail to observe that, in 
addition to 40 percent of the labor force who officially benefits fron 
the system, the traditional Abegglen's "paternal relations" has morally 
worked as the basis of industrial relations in small scale workshops and 
factories. But in general, v^le this systm confers a sense of security 
to regular workers, it has been scenevdiat exploitative in relation to 
eirployees of sub-contractors, wanen workers, and part-time or teitporary 
workers, who can be regulated easily over business cycles. Seme modifi- 
cations in the system are closely related to this claim (due to reasons 
number 2 and 4 above); therefore, the employers are less keen to pretend to 
retraining such concepts as "paternal relations" and "loyalty". And if 
the tendency to weaken is extrapolated, one may assume that this system is 
gradually disappearing.^ 
However, in spite of all these controversies, the industrial 
relations as such have so far worked in Japan in such a way that Japan 
enjoys a high degree of stability in her labor market. For exanple, 
between 1960 and 1970 the average monthly separation rates in the 
Ibid, p. 35. 
See for exanple, R. Minami, The Turning Point in Econcmic Development: 
Japanese Experience, (Tokyo: Kinokunia, 1973); and Marshall, op. cit. 
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manufacturing industries in Japan was 2.3 in catparison to 4.25 and 2.7 
for the American and British industries respectively.^ Ihis has also 
contributed to a low frictional and structural \onenployment rate, thus 
reducing the overall unafrployment rate. 
It is essential that, Japanese industries have maintained, 
still to a good degree, a sound structure on a long-run basis. In this 
way they have contributed truly to the growth of industry and econcmy. 
Suimiary 
In the course of econonic development the general tendency of 
the Japanese labor force was to move frcm low-to relatively high-pro- 
ductivity sectors. At the beginning of industrialization this was not 
difficult, as the low-prdductivi-tY activities (especially agriculture) had 
the over-supply of labor. On the other hand, other sectors of the econcmy 
v/ere growing, creating continuous demand. This resulted in the out-migration 
of the labor force frcm the agricultural to the non-agricultural sector 
on the one hand, and frcm small-size to large-size firms on the other. 
Although this prsocess is still at work, labor has demonstrated 
increasingly less tendency to do so. The result is that Japan has been 
facing shortage of labor since the early 1960's. 
The history of modem Japan indicates that, Japan has possessed 
one of the most educated labor forces in the world. This has been one 
of the assets v^ch contributed to the growth of the Japanese economy. 
Finally, Japanese industries have maintained a sound and 
stable'Structure on a long-run basis. This has been the result of 
1 
Boltho, op. cit., p. 35. 
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a growing econotiy, characterized by kind of industrial relations vhich 
have been well-incorporated by the Japanese traditions, norms, and values. 
However, this is not to say that labor market with above 
qualifications has been the key factor for the growth of the Japanese 
econoty; rather it is to say that it has been certainly a major factor. 
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CHAPTER V: LEADING RDLE OF INVESTMENT 
So far, sane of the najor factors that contributed to the 
rapid growth of the Japanese econotiy have been discussed. They are the 
early and rapid expansion of the agricultural sector and availability of 
an adequate, skilled, cheap, and well-disciplined labor force. However 
these factors, though of crucial irrportance, could not have by thenselves 
supported the rapid rate of advance of the Japanese econony without a 
sustained and high rate of capital formation. 
The study of investment has two aspects. The first is to 
consider the sources fron vdiich investment funds were derived, that is a 
discussion of savings. The second is to examine the nature and corposition 
of the investment process. This chapter discloses the details of these 
two aspects. 
A) Finance of Investment 
Japan, significantly and almost entirely, raised the capital for 
development from internal sources (Table 5-1). The Japanese people and 
govemnoit were determined to mostly depend on their internal sources 
even when foreign capital was vigorously available to them. Such determin- 
ation led to the development of domestic market in directions favouring 
internal investment financing. 
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TABLE 5^1 . SHARE OF INVESamSTT AND SAVINGS 
IN REAL NET NATIONAL PRODUCT (.1908 - 1974) 































Sources; K. Ohkawa and H. Rosovsky, Japanese Econanic Gra^^, 
(Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1973), Table 6.9 
and Basic Statistical Tables 1 and 5; UN, Yearbook of 
National Account Statistics. 
Notes; * I = Net Fixed Capital Formation 
S = Net Total Savings 
Hbwrever, fran time to time Japan had to look to the outside 
world to meet shortages of funds at hone; but such borrowing did not 
make her dependant on the world capital markets. This is because Japan 
took special measures to prevent such dependance in her dealings with 
foreign suppliers. Thus, while capital inflow was permitted to meet the 
needs of the econcny an analysis of the characters and conditions 
surrounding this inflow discloses seme of the special features of 
Japanese relationship to foreign capital.^ 
a) Domestic Market - the Main Source of Funds 
In the early Meiji Rule, as in the Tokugawa era, the primary 
source of capital was the agricnrltural sector, and the means of transfer 
1 
This subject is discussed in detail in Section b of this chapter. 
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was taxation. A land tax was introduced in 1873 wMch required 
fanners to pay a fixed charge on the newly assessed value of their 
land amomting to about 25 percent of the yield, ^ Ibis taxation policy 
as one of the steps in the Meiji reform accelerated the transfer of the 
surplus by imposing additional burdens on the peasants. According to 
Paul Baran . .no effort was spared to squeeze as much as possible out 
2 
of hard-pressed direct producers." While in the first half 
of the nineteenth century 39 percent of farmers* inccme was left for 
their consurrption and purchase of crops, after the reform it fell to 
3 
32 percent. These taxes were a very high proportion of government 
tax revenue; the land tax furnished over 90 percent of state 
revenues in the early 1870*s. Twenty years later it still accounted for 
as much as 60 percent (and still provided a third at the time of World 
War I) 
As tlie bulk of population were peasants and deprived ly the 
high taxes, tlrie rate of private saving for the late nineteenth century 
was low; and not only that, it was declining - it declined from 
5 
7.7 percent of net national incone in 1887-96 to 4.7 percent in 1899-1906. 
^ W.McCord, "The Japanese Model", in The Political Econory of Developgrient 
and Underdevelopanent, C.K.Wilber, ed., (New York: Randcm House, 1973), p. 280. 
2 
P.Baran, The Political Econcmy of Growth, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1967), p. 154. 
^ Ibid, p. 155. 
4 
Ohkawa & Rosovsky, op. cit., p. 61. 
5 
H. Rosovsky, Capital Formation in Japan, (New York: The Free Press, 1961) 
p. 9. 
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With the beginning of the -b^^entieth century, the saving ratio 
started to increase. As industrialization got under way, factors 
such as interest rates, actual (and expected) changes in prices, and 
money income eventually affected the rates of saving. The result was an 
increase in the rates at which the private sector saved. This trend 
continued till around 1917 vAien the net saving as a proportion of net 
national product reached the peak of 22.4 percent (Table 5*1). However, 
in spite of this achievement at this date, the overall rate of savings 
before World War I was low.^ 
After World War I, the favourable condition provided by the 
2 
War was disrupted by internal and external events. Consequently the 
rates of savings sharply declined during the 1920*s. Furthermore, the 
recovery process to offset damages due to the great earthquake of 1923 
even corpelled hous^olds to borrow (Table 5^2). In the course of a 
general recovery of the econcny during the 1930's the saving ratio 
started to increase again (Table 5-1). Then during World War II and a 
3 
short period after, the rates of savings remained very low. However, 
once the econcxry acquired mcmentum and incone started to grow the rates of 
savings also followed the same pace. Indeed, it is the post-war saving 
ratios which have been impressive. On average, for the period between 
1956 and 1974 the share of net savings in net national incone was 26.1 
percent (Table 5-1). Table 5-3 provides an international coiparison for 
a few countries which recorded relatively high saving ratios in the post 
war period. As it shows, the saving propensity of the Japanese was 
1 
See for exaitple, Rosovsky, op. cit., Table 3, p. 9. 
2 
As mentioned in Chapter II. 
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TAELE 5^ . SAVING AS PERCEOTAGE OF GNP 
(CURRENT PRICES) 
Sources; For 1953 to 1972, Boltho, op. cit., p. 84; for 1973 and 
1974 IMF, International Financial Statistics; & UN, 
Yearbook of National Account Statistics. 
Note: * 1961 to 1972. 
higher than those in other comtries. 
A close look at Table 5^1 and 5«2 discloses that, as the level 
of savings ratios changed the carposition of savings also altered. But 
during most of the period, national savings originated mainly in the 
private sector and hence fluctuated with it. At the outset 
when the share of private savings in the total was low, so was the share 
of national savings in net national product; the periods vtei the share 
of private savings in total was the highest matched the peaks of 
national saving ratio (the years 1917 and 1937 in Tables 5-1 
and 5^2); and for the period after World War II vhen the shares of private 
savings are extremely high and increasing, national savings are irrpressively 
high and increasing. Finally, in recent years, as the share of private 
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savings decreased ~ viiich was due to corporations’ dissavings - the net 
ratio declined (for exartple figures for 1974). 
The analysis of danestic savings cartposition further reveals 
that the major savers in private sector were households (see 
conposition of private sector in Table 5^2), In order to analyze house- 
holds’ pattern of saving, an examination of their level of disposable 
inocme and share of saving in this incone is required. Unfortunately, 
relevant data are available only for the period after the Second V^rld 
War, v4iile for the preceding period data include savings of private 
corporations. However, data as collected in Table 5—4 indicate that there 
is a close positive relationship between the level of saving and disposable 
incone (whether the figures belong to total private sector in 1908 - 37 
or only to households and non-profit institutions in 1953 - 74). 
The other result of the above analysis is that everything noted 
earlier concerning the share of private sector in the coiposition of total 
savings also applies to the households' savings. That is, they both 
fluctiaated together, peaks were at 1917 and 1937 and ratios were high 
and rising after the Second Vforld War. There is however one exception: 
during the 1970's, although households continued to save increasingly higher 
proportions of their disposable income the total contribution of the private 
sector to national savings declined. As mentioned earlier and also as 
it is indicated in Table 5..2, this resulted fran corporations' dissavings 
(or their net borrowings). 
In sum, the domestic market has been the major source of funds 
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TABLE 5<r4 
DISPOSABLE INCOME AND SAVINGS 0^ PRIVATE SECTOR 































































Sources; From 1908 to 1937, Ohkawa^^Rosovsky , Japanese Economic 
Growth, op.cit.. Table 6,10& Basic Statistical Table 10; 
from 1953 to 1970 , UN, Yearbookof National Account Sta- 
tistics ; & OECD, Economic Survey, Japan, 1969&1975 , 
Note : * Except for 1974 all figures are 5 year moving average . 
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for capita, 1 accuniulation. In th© dcrnGStic inairk©t th© privat© s©ctor, 
and within it th© hous©holds, has b©en th© main contributor. It is 
thus clear that for economic growth Japan has relied mainly 
on domestic sources to acguire capital, while foreign savings were 
restricted to a purely caipensatory role. 
b) Foreign Market 
Japan’s international relations after the end of isolation 
- marked by entry of ConitKxaore Perry, 1853 - started on a conservative 
note. Frcm very early times the Japanese jealously guarded their 
tradition and culture, and their attitude towards foreigners was one of 
distrust. The fact that borrowing foreign capital often would carry 
foreign donination made the Japanese very cautious in boirrowing, especially, 
fron powerful countries. The necessary requirement for borrowing was 
for the government to be fully sure of being capable of repayment. 
Consequently, during the period from the Meiji Restoration to the close 
of the Sino-Japanese War (1895) Japan borrowed overseas only twice. Two 
moderate-sized loans were floated in London, totaling only 16.6 million 
yen in face value, the first one issued in 1870 and the other in 1873.^ 
In addition, Japan received frcm abroad considerable short-tern credits 
2 
and a small amount of direct investment. By 1895, with the cuinrent 
account shifting to surplus and with the government having a strong 
E.P.Rubens, "Foreign Capital and Dcmestic Development in Japan", in 
Economic Growth; Brazil, India, Japan, S. Kuznets, et al., eds., 
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955), p. 185. The interest 
rate for the first one was 9 percent and for the second one was 7 
percent, see Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan, op. cit., p. 253. 
2 
Ibid, p. 185. 
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tendency for fast liquidation; all of the long-term loans, and most 
of the short-term credits were liquidated - leaving virtually no foreign 
obligations,^ The current surplus was used to liquidate past debt 
outstanding. 
The attitudes towards borrcwing overseas changed after the 
Sino-Japanese War, making 1896 a turning point in Japan's international 
relations. Frcm this year, there was a rapid ejq^ansion of foreign borrowings. 
Indeed, the indemnity following the Sino-Japanese War played a very 
significant role in this regard. This transfer, received in London in 
2 
sterling during 1896-98, yielded Japan 364 million yen. And it provided 
Japan with a gold and sterling reserve with vtech she made the irtpartant 
3 
shift to the gold standard in 1897 vMch, in turn, improved Japan's 
credit standing to the point where she could barrow advantageously in 
4 
foreign capital markets. This transfer and that from Japan's 
victorious interference in the Boxer Rebellion in China (received in 
annual installments with interest at 4 percent v\hich yielded 24 million 
yen fron 1902 through 1913^) were also ranked as another principal category 
Okita & Miki, "Treatment of Foreign Capital...", op. cit., p. 143. 
Rubens, op. cit., p. 187. 
Lockwood, op. cit., p. 19. 
As an exanple, on a £10 million loan'floated in London in the first 
decade of this century she only paid 4.4% interest (Ibid, p. 254) 
cotpared to 9 & 7 percent interest she paid on previous loans (see 
footnote 1 on previous page. 
op. cit., p. 187. 
5 
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of capital available to Japan, Sane of than coipensated for the Wars' 
expenses and the rest were spent, partly to redeem a small amount of 
government bonds, adding to the nation's specie holding abroad, but 
mainly for further military expansion.^ 
Businessnoi vvho had expected the inflow of inderaiities in 
excess of the wars’ costs would lead to relaxation of the prevailing 
. 2 . 
tight money policy and in turn to a lower interest rates actively 
started to develop the industries. But as government had allocated 
these funds mostly for military purposes, total capital requirements 
outran dcnestic capital. Finally, the national government took steps 
to facilitate foreign capital inflow to meet the shortages at hone. This 
new policy began with a series of government bond floatations abroad with 
3 
an initial amount of 43 million yen , These loans were made through 
the Industrial Bank of Japan v^ch functioned as a central organ through 
Tfthich private firms were supplied with funds for the development of 
. 4 
Japanese industries . The existence of such a central organ, vhich was 
against the background of a cautious attitude towards foreigners, 
strongly prevented direct foreign investment in industries selected by 
foreigners. 
As the torpo of econcmic activities was very strong and as 
dorestic capital was in short supply, Japan borrowed overseas frequently. 
93 million yen worth of donestic bonds were floated abroad 
^ Okita & Miki, op, cit., p. 143. 
2 
This policy is kncwn as the "Matsukata Deflation". Matsukata, then 
the Finance Minister adopted a very strong deflationary policy to 
canbat the severe inflation vdiich had resulted from issuance of large 
amount of inconvertable government notes in preceding years, ibid, p. 142. 
3 
Rubens, op. cit., p. 186. 
4 . 
Okita and Miki, op. cit,, p, 144. 
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and another hlO inillion loan was obtained in London between 1897 to 
1903.^ Yet, the prevailing fear of possible foreign domination 
dictated that, now that Japan had to rely on external sources', foreign 
capital was to be used directly for productive purposes in order to 
assure repayment. Thus, the floating of bonds overseas to raise funds 
for armament or for other non-productive services was opposed by the 
general public. They dannanded that if the government was to increase 
foreign capital by floating bonds, the capital should be used for 
2 
purchasing danestic bonds and stock by the fiscal authorities. But the 
event to cane turned out to be very costly for Japan r making the government 
reluctant to respond to the public demand. 
The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 catpelled the 
Japanese to increase the inflow of capital markedly. Total war 
3 
expenditure amounted to 1,720 million yen sane of which was supplied 
4 
through 800 million yen worth of bonds issued overseas and a number of 
foreign issues of individually smaller amounts along with sane sales 
5 
abroad of danestic issues . But not only did these funds help finance 
of the War, they provided backing for the ever-increasing bank-note 
Lockwood, op. cit., p. 254. 
2 
Okita & Miki, op. cit., p. 146. 
3 
To give an indication, this amounted to one quarter of GNP of 1905 
and 1905; calculated by dividing this figure by G3SIP figures as given 
in Ohkawa & Rosovsky, Japanese Econcmic Growth, op. cit., p. 278. 
4 
Okita & Miki, op. cit., p. 147. 
5 
Rubens, op. cit., p. 186. 
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issue by increasing specie reserves. 
The Russo-J^anese War made Japan a major debtor in the 
international capital market. Japan won the War, but she received no 
indemnity, and bearing the burden of foreign debts she did not enjoy an 
industrial bocm like the one after the Sino-Japanese War, By the time 
the First World War broke out, outstanding foreign indebtedness of the 
national government stood at 1,599 million yen viiich accumulation had 
provided in financial terms about one-sixth of the State revenues from 
2 
all sources. In addition to the national government's borrowing some 
capital was imported by municipal governments as well as Japanese 
corporations. By the end of 1913, their total obligations outstanding 
3 
was 370 nu-llion yen. 
At this point an important shift in policy resulted. In the 
process of development of industries Japan realized that the need for 
technological borrowing was much stronger than foreign capital. Therefore, 
the Japanese policy shifted to encourage also direct foreign investment 
in the form of joint ventures v^ch were often supported by technical 
4 
licensing agreements. 
Nevertheless, years immediately preceding World War I saw Japan's 
payments of interest on foreign debts steadily increasing and her imports 
of goods and services were exceeding exports. There was as a result, a 
5 
net outflow of gold and silver . These were, on the whole, the signs of 
^ Okita & Miki, op. cit., p. 147. 
2 
Rubens, op. cit., p. 186. 
3 
Ibid, p. 186. 
4 . 
Okita & Miki, op. cit., pp. 149, 150, 153. 
^ IhM, p. 150. 
110 
potential instability and crisis for years to come. 
But the situation turned wll for Japan when the First World 
War broke out. The World War I period was marked by virtual cessation 
of capital inflow; indeed, there was a net outflow as the wartime boon 
in exports and the' shipping industry generated a huge surplus. By the 
end of 1919, Japan stood as the net creditor visr-a-vis the rest of the 
world with a net foreign surplus on current account of 2,431 million 
yen wliich had been accumulated in specie holdings and other assets abroad.^ 
However, this period was short lived as the borrowers soon 
liquidated their loans and the specie holding abroad was used up to 
. 2 
support an overvalued yen and to finance the trade deficit of 1920^s. 
During the twenties although the value of Japan’s ej<ports did not decline, 
a huge amount of foreign exchange started to flow out reflecting a sharp 
increase in inports.^ 
Again, Japan was canpelled to borrow overseas. However, it was 
never carried to the same relative inportance as in the 1896-1913 period. 
For exairple, the net foreign debt outstanding in 1929 in current value was 
4 
748 million yen as ccaipared to 1,432 million yen in 1913, Moreover, the 
former volume was relatively much smaller in relation to national inccme 
Rubens, op. cit., p. 190, 
Lockwood, op, cit,, p, 259 
Okita & Miki, op, cit,, p, 151, 
4 
Rubens, op. cit., p. 190, 
Ill 
(5,9 percent in 1929 carpared to 33,7 percent in 1913)^, Another 
inportant difference between these two periods was that there was a sub- 
stantial increase in private industrial debentures and a marked decrease 
2 
in the amount of national and local government bonds, 
Japan continued to borrow overseas till the depressed years 
3 
of the late 1920’s . During the 1930*s foreign floatation of Japanese 
long-term loans entirely ceased and inflow of direct foreign investment 
4 
was also quite limited. 
After the Second World War a huge amount of military expenditure 
was cut down to a minimum enabling the Japanese government to maintain 
a balanced donestic budget. Nevertheless in this period Japan was in 
need of forehjn capital. Frcm 1946 to 1950 Japan irported capital amounting 
to 2.7 million dollars, 70 percent of vtiich was provided by financial 
5 
aid frcm the U.S.A. American financial aid was acccspanied by American 
advisory policy to canibat the inflation developed in the year immediately 
after the War. The policy is known as the "Dodge Line", for it was 
formulated by J.H.Dodge, Chairman and Director of the Detroit Bank and 
Trust Co. v\ho later was appointed as an advisor to General MacArthur (the 
^ Calculated by dividing the above figures by the corresponding figures 
for national incone as given in Ohkawa, et al., op. cit., p. 247. 
2 
Okita & Miki, op. cit., p, 151. 
3 
The depression had resulted mainly by lifting of gold embargo and re- 
embargo causing a fall in the foreign exchange rate of yen, ibid, p. 153. 
4 
Ibid, p. 153. 
5 
Ibid, p. 157, 
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Suprerie Connander of the Allied Powers): ,'^ The policy slowed down 
the econaiy; nevertheless, by fixing the exchange rate of 360 yens 
equal to a dollar, dcsmestic and international prices more or less 
2 
were set in balance. 
However, as it was felt that the Japanese econory was still 
in a state of disorganization seme measures were taken to protect 
dcmestic industries and to restrict capital inflow so as to offset 
the heavy outflow of the earnings of foreign investment vdiich might 
have led to a deterioration of Japan’s balance of payments and weakening 
the econory. These measures included the enactments of the Foreign 
Exchange Law and Foreign Trade Control Law in 1949 and the Foreign 
3 
Investment Law in 1950. Under the Foreign Investment Law foreign 
investment was required to contribute to the iirproyement of Japan's 
international accounts and to the development of key industries and 
public utility services, and should not inpede Japan's postwar economic 
rehabilitation and development, and contracts for foreign investment 
4 
should not contain illegal or unfair clauses. In 1952, Japan joined 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; the latter 
extended a 40 million dollar credit to Japan which was the first sizable 
5 
foreign capital Japan had imported since the end of the First World War. 
Ibid, pp. 157-158. 
2 
Ibid, p. 158, 
^ Ibid, pp. 158-59. 
4 
Ibid, p. 159. 
^ Ibid, p. 158. 
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m the second ha,lf of the 1950’s vhen it ws realized that 
the Japanese econcfn^ had markedly expanded, the Foreign Investment Law 
was relaxed ’ resulting in an increase in inports of capital 
(Table , Similar to the prewar period, at this time the inflow of 
capital was acconpanied by advanced technology to fill a techno- 
logical gap created during the War between Japan and the Western nations. 
The relaxation of the Foreign Investment Law, which has 
happened several times since 1959, did not eliminate the burden on 
direct foreign investment. Under the provision of the latest revised 
Foreign Investment Law, direct foreign investment in agriculture, forestry, 
fishery and certain sectors of other industries are still restricted.^ 
Therefore, it can be said that Japan of post World War II is 
not significantly different from the past. She is still reluctant to 
iirport capital. Her industrial units hardly rely on foreign capital 
especially in the form of direct investment. This is clearly shown 
in Table 5.5 vtoch indicates that foreign capital as a proportion of 
total investment had been below one percent except for 1975 which was 
slightly over 2 percent. 
A closer look at Table 5«5 also reveals that although in 1950 
direct foreign investment was much higher than other long-term credits, 
in tlie following years it grew at such a relatively low rate that it was 
surpassed by the latter by a considerable amount. In fact, this is the 
^ M. Fujiko, Japan and The World Econaty, (Japan: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 1977), p. 10. 
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TABLE 5-5 
FOREIGN CAPITAL IN PRIVATE NON-MONETARY SECTOR 
(1950, 1960, 1970, 1975> 
CXn luillion of US dollars). 




Volume of Direct Investments 
Cas % of domestic investment) 
Other Long-term Liabilities 
(as % of domestic investment 
Total 




























Source : IMF , Balance of Payments Yearbook ; and.: IMF, 
International Financial Statistics 
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main feature of ghfft jji attitude towards foreign capital. In other words, 
the increasing reliance on foreign danestic investment vSiich. became a 
feature of Japanese development during a short period was corrected and 
foreign loan, once again, became the major vehicle of foreign capital. 
However, she is today a net creditor country. 
Another feature of the postwar Japanese economy is worth noting. 
With increasing economic development, Jap>anese industrialists have 
aggressively sought investnoent outlets in foreign countries. Japan is 
today a major capitalist nation and her tireless efforts to seek foreign 
and investment outlets is a measure of her increasingly iitportant role 
in the world capitalist system. 
This status became firmly established in the early ,1960's and 
was facilitated by the shift to surplus on current account after 1965 
(Table 5»6). In fact, in this year Japan reached net creditor status 
with outflow of capital exceeding the inflow by approximately $500 million. 
Since then she has been very successful in maintaining this position (except 
in 1969 and 1971 \Aien she became a net debtor by $23 and $1,353 million, 
respectively). 
A continuous deficit in the capital account reflects, among 
other things, increased direct foreign investment abroad. As Table 5J7 
shows Japanese direct investment abroad are growing at an unprecedented 
rate: between 1967 and 1974 they registered an average annual rate of 
growth of 31.4 percent - much higher than U.S.A., Britain, West Germany, 
V 
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total direct overseas investment by these main capital ej^rters fran 
1,4 percent in 1967 to 5,6 percent in 1975 (cotr^ared with U.S.A’s 52.5 
percent, Britain's 14,4 percent and West Germany’s 6.7 percent)., Hcwever, 
share of overseas direct investment in GNP was the lowest for Japan 
among other^mentioned jiations, 
Direct overseas investment is not unrestricted in Japan- 
Rather the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law r- even 
after carrying sane degree of liberalization since 1969 - inposes 
restriction on the export of capital by Japanese investors. This 
law, generally, excludes investment in the fields classified either 
as "being problematic with respect to international cooperation 
and diplanacy", or as "having grave adverse effects on the Japanese 
econany".^ It also restricts foreign investment by Japanese nationals 
2 
pearl nursery, banking and securities brokerage industries. 
Since Japan restricts the inflow of foreign capital, its policy 
of restriction of the outflow of foreign capital may spring fron her wish 
to make scarce donestic capital more fully served the needs of Japan's 
internal deve3.opment. The investment that is permitted to. take place 
overseas is also made caiplementary to the needs of Japan's internal 
econot^. First, it has been concentrated in the developnent of natural 
3 
resources in recipient countries. This has secured the continuity and 
Japan’s Overseas Investment, 1977, (Japan: Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry), p. 1. 
^ ^^id, p. 1, 
3 
Mostly the developing countries of South and South East Asia, Africa, 
Latin America and the Near and Middle East; and U.S.A. and Canada 
among advanced capitalist countries; for more/see Statistical Survey 
of Japan's Econcmy, 1976, (Japan:Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
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diversification of raw joaterial si:^ply necessary for Japanese development. 
Secondly, it has been allocated for establishing distribution operations 
in host countries thus it has helped support the increased export of 
goods and services. Finally, overseas investments have provided the 
location for Japan's labor intensive and high pollution industries.^ 
To sum the above study indicates that self-reliance has 
been a powerful factor influencing Japanese attitude towards foreign 
capital. However, in carrying out such a policy Japan took care to see 
that in shutting out foreign domination she did not lose the benefits 
of foreign technologies, Japan, thus, is a classic example of a 
country that carried out her development mainly through reliance on her 
indigenous savings and resources without losing the crucial benefits of 
foreign technology. 
B) Investment and Growth 
Japanese institutions of the pre-modem era had been set in such 
a way that the surplus of the society was transferred from productive 
to urproductive sector - that is from peasants and artisans to the Enperor, 
^ 2 
Shogun, and lords with their attached samurai class. This situation 
These locations are in the developing countries as mentioned in the 
prece ding footnote. As a rule the bulk of investments in manufacturing 
industries has gone to developing countries, while the majority of 
those in ccxnmerce and the service industries have been made in the 
advanced countries of Europe and North America. (See Japan * s Overseas 
Investment, 1977, op. cit. ; and V. Dybov, "Japan Multinationals in 
the Structure of Viforld Capitalism", in International Affairs, No. 4, 
(1978), pp. 98-105. 
See Victor D. Lippid, "Economic Development in Meiji Japan and Contemporary 
China: A Corparative Study'!, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2(March 1978) 
55-81. 
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even worsened toward the end of this era vdien the various administrative, 
cereirpnial and formal expenses surpassed taxes and rents, they received. 
Ail these expenses made the latter groi:ps beccme deeply indebted to the 
emerging merchant class>^ who by this time had accumulated seme wealth, 
2 
These loans furthermore were seldan repaid to the lenders, and as such 
during the Tokugawa Rule there were few forces operating to increase 
3 
capital fomatron in the country. 
It was not until the Meiji Restoration succeeded in creating 
the potential and economic framework capable of capital development that 
the inpetus was proysided for fostering capital accumulation, 
a) Pattern of Investment after the Restoration until the 
World War II • 
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, it was the heavy 
taxation of tiie agricultural sector that provided the greater part of 
government tax revenue. Now, it must be added that, it was this tax 
revenue viiich enabled the government to issue debentures in payment of 
indemnities to the dislodged lords, to assume their debts, and to pay 
stipends to the ex-samurais until jobs were provided for thorn. Lords 
and samurais, as well as merchants, invested their funds in banks, stocks, 
landed estates, and industries. This accounted for the most significant 
contribution to the primary accumulation of stock of saving. However the 
For a detailed discussion see Maddison, op. cit., p. 7 and Rosovsky, 
"Japan’s Tr<ansition to Modernity;, op. cit., p. 123. 
Baran, op. cit., p. 152. 
R.R.Nelson, "Growth Models and the Escape frem the Low-Level Equilibrium 
Trap; The Case of Japan", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
SCOetdber 1959), 378-388, p. 383. 
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accumulated saving was used extensively in mercantile activities (such 
as comncxiity speculation, trade and money lending) rather than for 
2 
industrial purposes. Hence, we find that for the period before the 
turn of the century, the annual rate of growth of capital stock was only 
3 
about 2 percent. Therefore, the rate of growth of 3.8 percent per year 
4 
of real income was attributed more to the increase in the efficiency of 
the economy than to the growth of capital. 
The growth process can be conceptualized in the form of the 
5 
following equation; 
Gy = s5 + r Q 
#iere Gy = Rate of growth of incone * 
s = The saving ratio = s ^ 
y 
<5 = The technical marginal efficiency of 
investment^ = £^y , 
1 
and r. ~ Percentage increase in national incone 
resulting from organizational land human 
intprovement. 
Basically, growth results fron increase in the rate of capital formation. 
Proportion of inventory in gross donestic capital is the highest before 
1900; see Table 5-9. 
2 
Baran, op.cit., pp. 155-56. 
3 
Nelson, op.cit., p. 385. 
^ S. Kuznets, Modem Economic Growth, (New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 1966), pp. 252-56, Table 5-6. 
c 
This equation is taken from K.J. Charles, "Capital Efficiency and Econcmic 
Growth", Economic Affairs, 12(1967), 15-28. This article, while viewing 
the growth process of India, reveals that for developing countries increase 
in rate of capital formation does not necessarily result growth unless 
it is accompanied by organizational and human improvement; S. Kuznets, 
Population; Capital, and Growth, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 
1973), pp. 128-29, also has an interesting argument in this regard. 
Perhaps it should be pointed out that the technical marginal efficiency 
6 
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or from increase in the efficiency with which capital and other factors 
are utilized. During this phase - the years before the turn of the 
century - vhat happened in Japan was that while s/y, and, in turn, 
I/y, did not rise markedly, the efficiency factor (r) increased sub- 
stantially. 
As noted earlier, for nearly 150 years prior to the Restoration 
(1868), Japan's income and capital had remained virtually constant. After 
the Restoration to around 1900, though savings and investments did not 
show any marked improvement, the national income grew at a rate of 3.8 
percent. From this, we may assutte that the increase in national income 
was largely due to improvement in efficiency of the econany, due to the 
efficiency factor r in equation 1. 
This requires further clarification. In a country, in which 
efficiency is neither unusually high or unusually low, we may expect the 
value of the capital-output ratio to be around 3 to 4.^ Study of the 
capital-output ratios of different countries in different periods shews 
that for most of the countries, the capital-output ratio lies between 
this range. 
If we accept this to be the normal range of the value of 
of investment, as used here, is not related to the concept of marginal 
efficiency.of capital introduced by Keynes in his General Theory. The 
latter measures the expected rate of profits, whereas a used in this 
analysis measures the amount of output yielded by one unit of 
investment. 
1 
Kuznets, Modem Economic Growth, op.cit., pp. 252-56, Table 5-6. 
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capital-output ratio, then we may hypothesize that if the actual value 
of capital-output ratio turns out to be lower than 3 then the econony 
was subject to substantial irrprovement in organizational efficiency. 
On the other hand, if the incronental capital-output ratio turns out 
to be more than 4, we may assume that organizational inefficiency has 
been at work in the Nonary. In terms of our equation, this would mean 
that in the latter case r has a negative value. It is possible, of 
course, that a close examination will show that a high incremental 
capital-output ratio may be due to organizational inefficiency, as to 
high capital-output ratio required in seme sectors of the economy due 
to high capital intensity and construction of massive infra-structural 
activities. Even here, the conceptual framework provided in this 
analysis may suggest that a country is spending large amounts on social 
overhead capital. The case of Japan,' since she entered a period of 
rapid growth without any marked improvement of savings and investments 
from the period of stagnation, provides a basis for inferring that 
inprovement in organizational factors accoimted for her growth during 
this period. 
In Chart A, for exaiiple, if the capital-output ratio of Japan 
had been within the range of 3 and 4, the actual rate of growth of 
national income would have been between 0.85 and 1.1 percent. But 
actually during this period income increased at an annual rate of 3.8 
percent. This leads us to conclude that the efficiency factor was 
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similar periods the r factor was negative and incremental capital-output 
ratios of 8.0 and 7.0 percent, respectively, produced growth rates of 
income of 1.49 and 1.66 percent, respectively - while saving ratios for 
both countries were higher than that of Japan.^ 
With the private sector busy in mercantile activities, indus- 
trialization began with the government's own initiative in investing 
heavily in social overhead of railroads, roads, irrigation canals, 
comnunication systems, basic industries, and in the production of 
machinery. In addition, government provided different and significant 
stimulus for private investors - such as coirmitment to purchase many 
years' output of the newly established concerns while providing a guaranteed 
return on the investments. It was in this way that the transfer of capital 
2 
frcm mercantile to industrial activities was induced. These efforts 
led to a gro^/th rate of investment of 13.7 percent frcm 1890-1895, 8.5 
percent frcm 1895-1900, and 8.2 percent fron 1905-1910 (Table 5-8). Not 
only that, during this phase while GNP grew annually at 12,3 percent frcm 
Ibid., Table 5-5 and 5-6. 





INVESTMENT AND OUTPUT (1890-1940) 
(5-=-year moving average,mi 11 ion yen of 1932-34) 
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a905-40) 6.9 3.7 20.1 
Sources; For 1890,1895 &1900, Rosovsky, Capital Formation in 
Japan, op.cit.,p.2&p.9; for the rest of the period 
Ohkawa & Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth,op.cit., 
p. 288 
Notes; 1 Due to different sources, figures are not adequately 
comparable before and after 1900? therefore, the calcula- 
tion of annual rate of growth is interrupted at this year. 
2 1= Gross domestic fixed capital formation 
Y= GNP 
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1890 to 1895, 8.0 percent for the second half of this decade, and 3.1 
percent frcm 1905 to 1910, increasingly greater proportions were demanded 
for investment activities (Table 5-8). 
With the boom following World War I, the volume of investment 
grew at an unprecedented rate of 15.8 percent, and also the investment 
ratio reached a record high of 20.2 percent. However, this boom was 
followed by the difficult years of adjustment to troublesome domestic and 
international events which lasted to the end of 1920's. During this phase, 
from 1920 to 1925 investment decreased at an average annual rate of 1.6 
percent, and even when it recovered it grew only at the moderate annual 
rate of 1.7 percent from 1925 to 1930. As a result, the gross investment 
ratio steadily' declined in this phase, from 2Q,2 percent in 1920 to 17,5 
p^cent in 1925 and even further, down to 16,8 percent in 1930, Therefore, 
output also grew at low rates during this period; at an annual rate of 
1.3 percent for the first half of the decade and 2,6 percent for the 
second half. 
With the structural changes in the econcst^^ after 1930, 
characterized by formation of the Japanese war econcrt^, the ecoriony as 
a whole recovered. Gross investment grew at an average annual rate of 
8.4 percent frcm 1930 to 1935 and 13,3 percent frcm 1935 to 1940, In 
fact, by 1940 the share of gross dcmestic capital formation in GNP rose 
to an all time high of 25,7 percent. But, as the war economy necessitated, 
a good proportion of dcmestic capital equal to approximately 31 percent 
was spent for military purposes. This was the greatest military expansion 
effort for Japan since the end of the Russo-Japanese War.^ 
^ Rosovsky, Capital Formation in Japaiji, op. cit., p. 15, 
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TmS. 5^9 . 
STOJCUURE OF GROSS DCMISTJC GAPIW, FOimTION aS92 - 1940) 










































Soiirce; Rosovsky, Capital Formation in Japan, op, cit,, Tables 1 & 4. 
12S 
As far as sectoral distribution of dcmestic capital is 
concerned, as the Japanese eoonat^ moved toward industrialization the 
relative share of investment for the agricultural sector steadily declined. 
As Table 5-9 indicates, although the amount of capital for this sector 
increased that is, fron 7.7 million yen in 1892-1901 to 67.9 million in 
1931-1940 - its relative share declined from 3i9 to 1.3 percent of gross 
dcmestic capital. Indeed, in spite of the fact that agriculture was the 
major producer of national output at least until the end of W.W.I, the 
investment share for this sector shifted frcm one low level to another. 
In other words, during this period the non-agricultural sector consumed 
the most part of domestic capital; that is 83.5 percent in 1892-1901 
to 92.8 percent in 1831-40. 
During these years, the public sector invested slightly more 
than the private sector (Table 5-10) - except for the year from 1912 to 
1921. However, agricultural investment and most of inventory investment 
TABLE 5-10, 















































Source; Rpsovsky, Capital Formation in Japan, opt cit, ■, Table 4, 
Note; 1 ■ NDCP - Net dcmestic capital formation. 
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were initiated by the private sector. Hence, even if we assune that 
the itajor share of agricultural investment came fron private sector, 
at best investment by the private sector will only equate that of 
public sector. Therefore, even after making such a generous adjustment, 
it is clear that the public sector participation in investment activities 
during this period is unusually high caipared to post-war period. 
However, once the capital consumed for militai:y purposes is excluded 
2 
the share of private sector in total investment would sharply increase. 
To sum up, Japan invested can average 20 percent of her GNP 
from the turn of the century until 1940. In this period Japan experienced 
two phases during which investment activities increased sharply: the year 
inmediately following W.W.I. and the year prece ding W.W.II. These 
phases correspond precisely to explicit phases of economic growth in Japan, 
b) Pattern of Investment after the Korean War 
As discussed in Chapter II, the most effective iit5)ulse toward 
the recovery of the Japanese econcn^ from the vast devastation of the 
Second World War was provided by the outbreak of the Korean War. In fact, 
what Japan experienced after this War was quite different from the past. 
That is Japan found herself in a boom of prosperity resulting from 
Rosovsky, ibid, p. 13. 
Ibid, Table 7. 
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TABLE 5-^11 
GROSS INVESTMENT AND GROSS OUTPUT 
(J.953-1975, in million yen of 1965 prices) 













































































































































Sources: Ohkawa & Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth , op.cit., 
p.289; and Statistical Survey of Japan's Economy^1976 . 
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4j.\c3::ea.sed dejiand for the production of goods and services, a result of 
this boon, investment activities regained momentum and went on at 
a pace vdrlch. can only be described.as feverish. For exanple, Japan^s 
investment’='Output ratio increased fron 20 percent in the first period^ 
to more than 30 percent in the second period (Table 5^8 and Table 5 J.1). 
A clear distinction between two periods under consideration 
must be made here. After and the Korean War, Japan saw non- 
governmental investment sharply increased. That is, vtole the continuing 
bocm resulted in an increasing share of investment in GNP, the private sector 
accordingly contributed increasingly to the formation of capital. 
Government sector no longer possessed the leading role in investment 
2 
undertaking, vhich was mainly due to a drastic decline in military investment. 
CoTparison of Table 5,12 with Table 5-.10 clearly suggests this difference. 
TABLE 5.12 . 
INVESTMENT*; PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC SECTOR (1955 - 74) 
percent 
Sources: UN, Yearbook of National Account Statistics; and O.E.C.O., 
Econcmic Survey, Japan (July 1975). 
Note: * - Investment = Net dcmestic capital formation. 
This figure actually belongs to the years from 1900-1940 (Table 5.8). 
To no more than 1 percent of GNP; see Halliday and McCormack, Japanese 
Inperialism Today, op. cit., p. 107. 
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Paring the years 1931 - 40 the share of government investment was 52,0 
1 
percent of total non'-agricultural capital investment \(^le in the second 
period^, for exajiple,. in the five years between 1955 and 1959 the share of 
goverament was 32,0 percent, Furthetmore as the table suggests this 
share was also steadily decreasing. 
Returning to the pattern of investment, at the beginning of 
the second period the investment ratio was much lower than the ratio 
at the end of the first period (Tables 5-8 and 5^11), But the general 
performance of the econot^ created an optimism for Japanese investors 
which led to greater and greater shares in the next phases, In the seven 
years from 1953 to 1960, investment increased at an average rate of 12.1 
percent a year. Such a high rate of capital accumulation resulted in 
a 7.7 percent annual rate of growth of econcray during this phase. Actually 
in 1953 when the investment-output ratio was 20,5 percent, the rate of 
growth was 5.4 percent v^le in 1960 the investment-output ratio was 
28.2 percent and the rate of growth was 15.8 percent. 
After 1960, Japan saw her concerns pouring enormous amounts 
of funds into plant and equipment investments. The share of GNP devoted 
2 
to capital investment was 30,6 percent in 1965, over 37 percent in 1970, 
and at extraordinary high level of 39.5 percent in 1973. However, after 
1973 when the powerful aggregate demand control policy, T^diich had aimed at 
controlling the prevailing inflation, exerted a deflationary pressure on 
Agricultural capital investment only formed 1,3 percent of gross 
dcmestic capital formation (Table 5,-9). 
2 
Although this year was a year of depression with grcwth rate of 
income at 4,3 percent - the lowest since the end of the Korean War. 
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the econoTT^ & considerable decline ,in the amount of investment for 
forthocsming years occurred (Table; 5^111, There was also another 
problen. The vast increase in production and the pattern of investment 
expansion had produced highly undesirable side-effects which seriously 
and increasingly affected the well-being of the people. Therefore, in 
the new policies scsne measures, were taken to bring a shift in attitude 
froT\ total cormitment to quantitative ^owth of incone to iitprovement 
1 
of quality of life and the promotion of social welfare. While these 
measures were not very effective, to the degree they were actually 
applied, they increased the amount of investment required per additional 
mit of GNP (because these goals are considered less productive). 
The inpressively high investment-output ratio for the entire 
period was acMeved as a result of the conbination of three major 
developnents. These were the increase in total annual national inccitie 
(or output) which is to say in the resources available for division 
between saving and consurrption; a rise in the proportion of income 
saved; and a decline in the price of capital goods relative to the price 
of other cotponents of ,the national product, presumably reflecting a 
decline in the relative production cost of capital goods. These devel- 
opments are illustrated in Table 5-13. 
Frcm 1953 to 1960 investment increased 280.3 percent (1953 = 
2 
100) mainly as a result of increase in incone (first row), and saving 
^ See Appendix! II. 
2 
Gross private investment (GPI) is conceptually identical to gross 
national saving (private saving + government saving), \Aien government 
saving is defined as the government surplus on incone and product 
account or government receipt over expenditure ^len government 
expenditure includes investment by government. 
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TABLE 5-13 
ANALYSIS OF FIXED INVESTMENT 

























Sources : First two columns from Denison and Chung, op.cit. 
p,114; the last column calculated from OECD, OECD, 
Main Economic Indicators . 
Notes : I GPI =Gross private investment 
2 FI =Fixed business investment 
3 Price ratio of GNP to fixed non-residential 
business investment 
4 Fixed non-residential business investment . 
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(second In I960, GNP in constant prices was 176,3 percent 
of 1953y and grosa national saying at current prices was 152,2 percent 
of 1953, increase in the ratio of the average prices of all output 
to the prices of investrt)ent goods cannot account for the increase in 
inyestnent since it increased only 1Q0,2 percent in this phase. 
The further rise in investment after I960 was mainly due to 
increase in real incate and the persistent drop in the price of investment 
goods in relation to the average prices of total output, Frcm 1960 
to 1971 real inccetie increased 298,4 percent (first row), and price ratio 
increased 143,2 percent (third row) , while the rise in gross saving rate 
was small (106,0 percent - second row). 
The moderate increase in investment from 1971 to 1975 (104.6 
percent), was also mainly due to increase in income and a favourable price 
ratio. In fact in this phase these two developments had to conpensate 
for the decline in the rate of saving (second row). 
In sum, when the entire period from 1953 to 1975 is considered, 
the ccmbination of all three factors; increase in inccme, gross saving 
rate, and the average price ratio of G3S1P to that of investment goods 
were responsible for investment. 
Conclusion 
Following Harrod and Dcmar, output growth is the product of 
the incremental output - capital ratio and of the average propensity 
to ScVe, Japan is a unique case where in fact both these variables 
were at high values in corparison to other advanced countries in 
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corparaible of developrient. The productivity of investnisnt 
ms 25 to lOQ percent higher than in other major econcmies^ \^le its 
saving ratio stood at world record levels since at least the mid 1950's 
(Table 5^1, l^reoveTf not only were saving proportions al3:eady high^ 
but also they were rising steadily ’ (at least \intil 1974), 
That Japan’s capital formation effort was very high, by 
international standards is well known investment ratio of 30 percent 
that has been maintained between 1953 and 1975 is unparalled by any of 
2 
the market econonies. However, it is true that international cross^ 
section analyses have often failed to detect a strong relationship 
between investment shares and GNP growth-rates• Nevertheless, in Japan’s 
case, the association seems striking, especially in the post Ilferld War II 
period. In other words, the fast growing Japanese econaty created a strong 
demand for capital. The main reason investment grew so much is 
obvious; the demand for investment was derived frcm the expanding dannand 
for end products which, in turn, staimed frcm the rise in incane created 
by the increase in production. However, it is not merely this spiral- 
increased investment leading to increased output and so expanded output 
leading to increased investment— which is the determinant of the growth. 
If any of the other organizational and human factors (such as expansion 
of labor force and improvement of their productivity, general advance 
in knowledge, irproved resource allocations, etc,) had not been favourable 
to growth of output,' capital would have increased less and its contribution 
to growth would have been correspondingly low. 
^ Boltho, Japan - An Econanic Survey,'op. cit., p. 12. 
Yearbook of National Account Statistics. 
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PART TEIREE 
CHAPTER VI: CCNCLUSIOSI 
This study has atterrpted to examine the econonic history 
of Japan with a view to identifying the factors that have contributed 
significantly to Japan’s impressive and unique record of econcmic 
developnent. It focused attention on the sequence of events following 
the Meiji Restoration (1868), because those events played a crucial role 
in setting Japan firmly on the road to modernization and industrial 
developnent, 
A little more than a century ago the nation arrived at a fateful 
crossroads in her econonic history. Confronted simultaneously by a 
crumbling donestic order and the pressure of an expanding I'festem world, 
Japan had to make an important decision on national policy. The conviction 
prevailed that fundamental changes in the established order and way of 
life had to be made. And, once it was decided to enter the world 
connunity and the technological age, there was little desire or 
possibility to retreat. 
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The history of Japan during the century follov^g this 
decision is one of the most dramatic stories of modern times. Throughout 
this history, although the econoi^ has been subject to many erratic 
fluctuations, the long-run tendency has been an acceleration of the 
growth rate and the development of an ever-increasing capacity for growth. 
The government of the country at all times showed an acute 
understanding of the requirement of development and pirrsued policies to 
encourage entrepreneurial talents and initiatives, but also protect 
and safeguard domestic enterprise. Without the initiative, talents 
and energy of Japan’s large cadre of entrepreneurs this outstanding 
performance would not have been possible. They have always been eager 
to seize upon profitable opportunities and willing to undertake the 
concomitant risks. 
In the thesisy a tentative assessment of Japan’s performance 
has been made (Chapter II), This chapter will reconsider some of the 
economic arguments advanced in Chapters III through V, to call attention 
to a number of significant aspects of Japan’s development process, 
1) Chapter III focuses on the importance of the agricultural 
sector in the advancement of the economy. It is disclosed that an 
agricultural growth was sufficient to provide the early impetus to 
growth. This vigorous sector continuously supplied the workers 
required in the expanding industrial sector. It provided much of the 
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savings that was required for investment in the rapidly expanding 
industries of the nation. It supplied food, contributed raw materials 
for industries, and directly or indirectly provided a large share of 
export earnings. 
2) Japan's high rate of growth is seen as depending on the 
availability of flexible supplies of labor. The main provision of this 
advantageous situation is found in the productivity gaps, and in turn, 
the wage differentials between the traditional and modem sectors 
The Japanese laborer also has been acknowledged for his education and 
skill, his capacity for hard work and discipline, and his devotion and 
loyalty to enterprise. The prime cause is observed in the educational 
practices of the nineteenth century, at the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate 
(Chapter IV). Education indeed is currently in favour with econcmists 
as the philosopher's stone on econonic development at all stages of 
evolution. But the history of Japan confounds conventional wisdcm. In 
many developing countries literacy drives and primary education have 
merely prompted people to leave the countryside and plunge into the towns, 
creating tragic slums, Japanese education did not do this for reasons 
related to family authority, love of the land and other factors. Thus, 
it enhanced and enriched the cultural norms and values and, in this 
way, helped develop a socio-econcmic system which is so unique to Japan. 
140 
Another source of socio~econc3Tdc co-ordination and stability v/as 
found in Japanese industrial relations practice which, as the logical 
extension of her culture, was well incorporated into its tradition, 
norms and values. 
3) Along with the human factors and an accorimodating econcmic 
environment there has been a rapid growth of the stock of capital. With 
the Japanese people confirmed in the habit of saving, Japan’s investment 
has been financed almost entirely by danestic savings. Also Japan's 
historical assimilation of foreign know-'how was achieved with relatively 
little direct investment by foreign business. 
This study has not considered in any detail the role played 
by Japan's foreign trade in her development. In Japan's development 
the dynamism of exports was largely a symptcm of the dynamism of the 
econony as a whole -- rapid growth of exports was the result of rapid 
growth of the econony rather tlrian its cause. 
This remarkable record of econcmic develqpnent has to be seen 
in perspective. While Japan has established a record of econcmic 
development that is un^)aralleled in world's modern history, she has 
also paid a heavy price for this singular achievement (^pendix II). 
A total conmitment to growth at times led to the neglect of human 
welfare, and sharp increases in consumer prices. Large cities manifested 
alarming signs of increasing environmental pollution, urban conjestion, an 
alarming rise in traffic accidents, an inadequate mass transportation system 
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and the general lack of public services and facilities of all kinds. 
But there are already signs that Japan has becane conscious of this 
lack of balance in her achievements. When a great nation mounting 
the most serious obstacle in her path to development turns her attention 
to addressing the imbalances in her social development, it can be 
reasonably expected that her traditional energy and intelligence will 
be successfully applied to the solution of this problem. But this is 
for the future to disclose. Meanwhile this subject opens interesting 
areas for research. One of these might be a tracing of the welfare costs 
of Japanese econcmic development at various times in her modem history. 
A fresh area to study could be a comparison of social costs involved in 
the developments of several fast growing industrial economies. This 
may reveal a positive correlation between the rate of growth of income 
and the value of welfare costs (or net social loss), Such an inter- 
relationship, if found, might provide yet another perspective for under- 
standing industrial development. 
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A PERSPECTIVE ON WELFARE DEVELOPMENT 
Any appraisal of Japanese econonic development has to 
consider not just production but viiat has happened to the standard 
of living and ^lat prices Japan has paid in achieving rapid, sustained 
growth. 
Prior to World War II the goal of national power through mil- 
itary strengtli meant that a significant portion, averaging more than 
1 
5 percent of the GNP, was allocated for this purpose. - Since 1945 
the prime objective of government policy has been econonic - first re- 
construction and then growth, while large military expenditures were 
precluded. Defence amounts to only one percent of the postwar GNP, and 
the government has used its funds instead for investment facilitating 
growth. 
Japan in 1868 had an economic structure and standard of living 
corparable to a densely populated underdeveloped country of today, not 
as poor as India but not very well off neither. The process of growth 
benefited different groups in various ways. Although virtually everyone's 
material welfare irtproved until World War II the rich middle class, 
mostly businessmen, government bureaucrats, landlords, and skilled 
labor in large firms benefited most. Agrarian tenants and other poor 
^ H. Rosovsky, Capital Formation in Japan, Table 5. 
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farmers, and unskilled labor generally, did less well because they 
constituted a vast reservoir of low-wage labor. 
In the postwar period, the benefits of growth have been much 
more widely diffused, partly as a result of government policy (expressed 
in increasing rice prices for farmers and progressive taxation, for 
instance^) but mainly because the industrial demand for labor has grown 
so rapidly that it has absorbed much of the labor reservoir, bidding, up 
wages, real or ncminal, in the process. 
While it is indisputable that from a purely materialistic point 
of view the Japanese econory has prospered, the Japanese consumer claims 
that he has paid too high a price for the high rate of economic growth. 
He has seen his countrymen sirffering and/or dying from pollution - resulted 
diseases; he has seen that his great attenpt of a high rate of saving has 
favoured the businessman not himself; he has seen inadequate and poor 
public amenities and services; above all, he has seen the lack of concern 
in the part of the policy-makers regarding these issues. Considering 
the consumers' claim therefore it should not be taken for granted that 
the increasing output has brought about a proportionate prosperity in 
the state of well-being of the Japanese people. There has certainly been 
deficiency of the Japanese economy in public works. A deficiency vMch 
has stemmed from the fact that the outstanding economic performance has 
been the consequence of continuous allocation of resources in favor of 
higher growth - that it, of capacity and productivity growth. Conse- 
quently, investment in the public sector has lagged seriously, creating 
J.A.Pechman, and K.Kaizuka, "Taxation", in H. Patrik and H. Rosovsky, 
eds., Asia's New Giant. 
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'increasing demands (associated sonetimes with violence) for a greater 
ejiphasis on the inprovement of social welfare. Thus, the Japanese 
eoonotiy faces problaifis created not only as a result of autonanous econonic 
forces prevailing in affluent societies vhich can be tolerated and 
accepted as an inevitable by-product of grcwth; rather, they stem frcm 
a conscious industrial policy consistantly pursued until recently. 
In an attenpt to reconstruct the econcny after World War II, 
formation of social overhead capital was considered as a constraint, 
on resource si:?)ply vdiich would tend to reduce the growth rate of 
productive capacity. Not only was the denand-generating aspect of such 
social investments catpletely neglected, but it was also treated "as if it 
were entirely of the pyramid-building variety with zero marginal 
1 
productivity". Later, despite some atterrpts in recognition of the 
inportance of the issue, it was not until the turn of the recent decade 
(1970) that the government enforced effective policies in favour of 
pi±>lic works. That is, frcm 1970 to 1972 social overhead capital rose 
2 
by 40 percent permitting a massive public investment program. Hcwever, 
in a short period, a policy to combat inflation superceded . this issue; 
ie^ the 1974 budget reflected a zero growth rate (in money terms) for 
3 
public es^nditure to stabilize accelerating prices . 
Nevertheless, by this time, as inferred frcm the above statement, 
it was realized that the nature of public work spending iitplies a great 
K.K.Kurihara, "The Growth Pobsntial of the Japanese Econcaiy", (The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 46. 




deal of danand-creating effect. Hence in 1977, the government eanbarked 
on a massive investment program by allocating over 21 percent more than 
the previous year, for public work spending, in order to coiibat the present 
recession," 
Of the problans the Japanese have faced, the one which is the 
most predoninant is environmental pollution. As an example^consider what 
the disease known as Minamata has done to the people among the four 
different regions of the country. In Minamata itself, mercury poisoning 
killed 46 and paralyzed and blinded over 70 villagers.^ The local 
fertilizer catpany had discharged a heavy concentration of merciry into 
the villagers' fishing territory. In 1959 (four years after death of 
first victim), a medical research team within the Welfare Ministry denied 
any connection between the mercury poisoning and the disease. When the 
connection was finally accepted and publicized in 1968, the disease 
had spread to many other areas. At present, half of the country's 
cormercial fishing ground is unfit and fishermen have to go into deeper 
2 
and deeper water to get a safe catch. In 1970 the Maritime Safety 
Agency announced that Japan's coastal waters were on the verge of turning 
3 
into a dead sea. Yet, the industrial waste continues to be discharged 
into the sea. 
In the Japanese diet, rice is as inportant as fish. Thus, the 
pollution of the water irrigating the rice fields is another severe problem. 
J.Halliday and G.McCormack, Japanese Inperialism Today, (Monthly 
Review Press, 1973), p. 191. 
2 
Ibid. 
Ibid, p. 192. 
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For a long tmie, the Japanese have suffered from a disease known as 
Itai - Itai (literal translation is "ouch-ouch") indicating the un- 
bearable pain caused by the disease . Although the reports of the synptons 
go back to 1910, it was not until the mid 1950's that it finally received 
sane attention. In 1959, it was identified as cadmium poisoning, 
resulted fran the waste of mining and smelting ocnpanies vhich was 
discharged into the water irrigating rice paddies. The disease 
victimized 123 persons, of whan 32 have died*. Finally, in 1968, the 
1 
government instituted controls on cadmium discharged. 
Various polutants are also discharged into the air \fthich are 
harmful or deadly if they are found in a sufficiently high concentration. 
Japan has sane serious exanples regarding air-pollution. In the heavily 
industrial districts of Kawasaki and Yokkaichis, several thousands of 
2 
people have suffered frax[ chronic respiratory disease. In May 1971, 
the city hospital of Kawasaki announced 10,000 of the above cases, as 
well as 100 cases of a pollution-induced disease affecting the brain. Since 
early 1970 *s the Tokyo residents have suffered from recurrent bouts of 
photochemical smog. In 1970, 4,000 persons were hospitalized and people 
were advised to stay indoors and to restrain fran any unnecessary activity. 
The wearing of oxygen masks has becone popular in heavily industrialized 
regions, for exanple, tlie fear of being the victim of pollution-related 
diseases has made at least 65 percent of the Tokyo residents believe that 
Information stated in this paragraph are taken fran E.S.Mills and K. 
Ohta, "Urbanization and Urban Problems", in Asia's New Giant, op.cit., 
pp. 730-31. 
Information stated in this paragraph are taken from Halliday and 
McCormack, op. cit., p. 192.k 
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they have to wear it at least oncse a month. 
To scene extent, regarding the present state of technology, 
pollution has been the bearable cost of high industrialization and 
econcenic progress. One must question v\^ether it is a realistic 
approach to consider even the slightest degree of pollution as being 
bearable. However, as this issue is not directly related to ny paper, 
an analysis of this question is not feasible. But the degree of 
environmental destruction in Japan, among other industrial countries, 
is so high that the neglect of this issue bedcmes obvious. In other 
countries it has been a matter of practicability that sane part of the 
productive capacity be directed toward waste treatment.^ In Japan, this 
allocation has been either forgotten or is negligible. During recession 
the first expenditure to be cut by corporations are those related to 
anti-pollution measures. During the present recession, in particular, 
the situation has degenerated as the high cost of oil led to use of 
low^rade fuels. The result will be an increase in the volume of pollutants 
being discharged into the environment. 
In addition to pollution, other irtportant problems to consider 
is those related to urbanization. The nature of industrialization prcniotes 
urbanization; ie.,corporations realize important econonies through the 
concentration of their activities in the large cities, where there is a 
more convenient access to'the money and labor market. Urban concentration 
however, has been dramatic in Japan, especially in Tokyo, Osaka, and 
Nagoya - centers of both enterprises and population concentration. 
^ Whether or not there has been sufficient allocation of resources to 
control pollution in these countries is another question, vyh.ose 
answer is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Naturally, the massive migration into the metropolitan ar^s as such 
has led to an explosive need for pi±>lic services. 
However, as a result of policies heavily weighted in favor of 
the construction of an industrial infrastructure for private enterprises, 
the needs of urban residents have been relatively neglected. That is, 
eoononized investment in public services has resulted in the delay of 
cx)nstruction of public housing, sewage systems, and transportation 
facilities, etc. 
Japan faces a severe housing shortage. The latest data reveals 
that the average occupancy figures for Canada (1975) 0.6; Finland (1970) 
1.0; Greece (1971) 0.9; Italy (1971) 0.9; U.K. (1971) 0.6; and U.S.A. 
(1970) 0.6, are all lower than Japan (1973) 1.1^. The solution to this 
prc±)lQn, however, has largely been the responsibility of the private 
sector. The private sector, in turn, has absorbed private savings and 
invested them in enterprises serving other purposes. 
Second, the sewage systen is inadequate in Japan. An average 
of only 35 percent of the urban population is sewered. Besides, it 
2 
should not be taken for granted that all of the sewered waiste is treated. 
Finally, there is a chain of problems related to urban concen- 
tration, One unsolved problem leads to another. For exairple, the housing 
shortage has lairgely contributed to oannuting problens. That is, it has 
made people accept housing vhere it is available, with little regard to its 
^ UN, Statistical Yearbook. 
See Mills and Ohta, op. cit., p. 729. 
2 
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distance fron the place of 'work. Japanese urban residents feel they spend 
excessive amounts of time cammiting. Data on increase in comiuting times 
is not available.^ However, the number of those ccranuting at least 
thiirfcy minutes per day in cities with a population between 300,000 and 
1,000,000 increased by 265.9 percent fron 1955 to 1970, while it increased 
by 140.9 percent in cities with a population over 1,000,000 during the 
same period.^ 
Lengthening oanmuting time, on the other hand, coribined with 
congestion primarily due to the lack of an adequate public transit syston - 
have decreased the traffic safety factor. The high death-rate in traffic 
accidents cannot be denied. According to Mills and Ohta's estimates, 
Japan and the Western European countries, possess the world's highest 
3 
traffic fatalil^ records. 
To sum up, there is no doubt that the objective econanic 
condition of almost all Japanese people has improved over the past 
century. However, Japanese consumers have not benefited proportionally 
fron the prosperity achieved 1:^ the econany as a whole. Previously a 
few of the several ill-effects of industrialization in Japan were 
mentioned —ill-effects viiich were tolerated until recently as an 
inevitable by-product of growth by many Japanese. While satisfying the 
denand for a higher level of social welfare is a challenge requiring an 
econanic solution, it is also inportant to form a solid social basis 
If available. 
2 
Mills and Ohta, op. cit., p. 725. 
^ Ibid, p. 739. 
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to support such economic condition needed to achieve the desired 
welfare of the people. The term "welfare" has many connotations. In 
general the quest for welfare seans to be focused on the balance of 
several elements sv5)porting human development despite the material 
affluence achieved. In Japan, there is a need for still further shift 
of resources frcm the production of private goods and services to public 
uses. The role of the government is crucial in this issue, although 
much of the expenditure has been-and should be - provided the private 
industries to protect the consumers and their environment. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abegglen, James C. The Japanese Factory. Glecoe, 111.; Free Press, 1958. 
Akamatsu, A. "A Theory of Unbalanced Grcwth in the World Econory", Voitov-' 
irtschaflliches Archive; Band 86, Heft 2, 1961. 
Allen, G.C. Japan's Economic Expansion. London: Oxford University Press, 
1965. 
Allen, G.C. "The Causes of Japan's Econanic Grovel", The Three Bank 
Review, 55 (1962), 3-21. 
Bale, M.D., and Greenshields. "Japanese Agricultural Distortions and 
tlieir V'felfare Value", American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
60(February 1978), 59-64. 
Baran, Paul A. The Political Economy of Growth. 2nd. ed. New York; 
r^ntlily Review Press, 1967. 
Boltho, Andrea. Japan - An Econanic Survey (1953-1973). London: Oxford 
University Press, 1975. 
Bronfenbrenner, Martin. "The State of Japanese Econanics", American 
Econanic Review, 46(1956), 389-98. 
"Can Lifetime Etiployment in Japan Last," The Econonist, (October 1, 1977). 
Charles, Koilpillai J. "Capital Efficiency arid Econanic Gra\rth", Econanic 
Affairs, 12 (1967), 15-28. 
Charles, Koilpillai J. and P.G.K, Pahikar. "Kerala; A Cautionary Tale", 
Development Digest:, 5 (January 1968), 82-90. 
"Conpetition With E.E.C.," Guardian, (February 23, 1977). 
Denison, Edward F. Why Grcwth Rates Differ. Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institute, 1967. 
Denison, Edward F., and W.K. Chung. How Japanese Econaty Grew So Fast. 
Washington D.C.; The Brodcings Institute, 1976, 
Dore, Ronald P. "Agricultural Inprovement in Japan:1870 - 1900", 
Econanic Development and Cultural Change, 9(October 1960), 69-91. 
Dore, Ronald P. "Education in Japan's Growth", Pacific Affairs, 
37 (Spring 1964), 66-79. 
158 
Dore, Ronald P. "The Innportance of Educational Tradition: Japan and 
Elsewhere", Pacific Affairs, 45 (1972), 491-507. 
Dore, Ronald P. Land Reform in Japan. London: Oxford University Press, 
1959. 
Dybov, V. "Japanese Multinationals i^ the Structure of I^torld Capitalism", 
International Affairs, ISIo. 4 (1978, 98-105. 
Frank, Andrd G. On Capitalism Underdevelopment. Botibay: Oxford 
Ikiiversity Press, 1975. 
Fujiko, Masao. Japan and the \told Econcary. Japan: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 1977. 
Hall, John Whitney. Japan - From Prehistory to Modem Time, 
New York: Delacorte Press, 1970. 
Halliday, Jon. "Japan - Asian Capitalism", N^ Left Review, 25(July- 
Augest 1967). 
Halliday, Jon. and G. McCormack. Japanese Inperialism Today. New York: 
Monthly Revieiv Press, 1973. 
Hollerman, L. "Foreign Trade ih Japan's Econonic Transition", in I. 
Frank, ed,, The Japanese Econcaiy in International Perspective. 
Baltimore: The John Hopkins Uhiversil^ Press, 1975. 
Imai, Ken'ichi. "Japan Industrial Organization", Japanese Economic 
Studies, 6 (Spring - Sumner 1978), 3-67. 
Inoue, Keichi. "From Labour Surplus to Labour Shoirtage Econcxry’.'The 
Case for Japan", International Labour Review, 113 (march - 
i^ril 1976), 217-25. 
"Is Japan Playing Fair? - Japan Has to Learn to Iirport," The Economist, 
(Oct<±)er 23, 1976). 
Japan - liLnistry of International Trade and Industry. Japan Overseas 
Investment, 1977 Edition. June 1977. 
Japan - Ministry of International Trade and Industry. White Paper on' 
International Trade, 1976. October 1976. 
Japan - Office of the Prime Minister. Statistical Flandbook of Ja;3an. 
1977,. 
Kanamori, Hisao. "What Accounts for Japan's High I^te of Gravth?", 
Review of Income and Wealth, 18 (1972), 155-71. 
159 
Kelley, Allen C., and J.G. Williamson. Lessons from Japanese Development. 
Chicago; The university of Chicago Press, 1974. 
Kershner, T.R. Japan's Foreign Trade. Lexington, J^lass.: D.C. Heath, 1975. 
Klein, Lawrence^ and K. dikawa. eds, Econcmic GroATth: the Japanese 
Experience since the Meiji Era. Homewood, 111.: Irwin, 1968. 
Kobayashi, Victor N. "Morale in Education and Social Development in 
Japan", Asian Profile, 5 (December 1977), 509-17. 
Kurihara, Kenneth K. "Japan's Trade Position in the Changing World 
Market", The Review of Econcmics and Statistics, 37 (1955), 
412-71. 
Kurihara, Kenneth K. The Growth Potential of the Japanese Econony. 
Baltimore: the Jolnn Hopkins Press, 1971. 
Kuznets, Simon., W.E. Jtoore and J.J. Spengler, eds., Econcmic Grcwth 
Brazil, India, Japan. Durham, N.C. : Duke university Press, 
1955. 
Kuznets, Simon. Modem Econcmic Growth. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1966, 
Kuznets, Simon. Population, Capital, and Growth. New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company Inc. 1973. 
Lewis, Arthur W, "Economic Development with Unlirtdted Supply of 
Labour", Manchester School, (May 1954). 
Lippid, Victor D. "Econcmic Development in Meiji Japan and Contemporary 
China: A Comparative Study", Cambridge Journal of Econcmics, 
2 (March 1978), 55-81. 
Lockwood, William W. The Econcmic Development of Japan. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1954. 
Lockwood, William W. ed. The State and Econcmic Enterprise in Japan. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 
160 
Maddison, Angus. Econanaic Grcwth in Japan and U.S.S.R.' London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1969. 
Maddison, Angus. "Japanese Econcxnic Performance", Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro Quarterly Review, 18 (December 1965), 299-355. 
Marsh, Robert M., and H. Minnari. "A New Look at 'Lifetime Connitment' 
in Japanese Industry", Economic Development and Qiltural Change, 
20 (July 1972), 611-30. 
Marshal, Byron K. "Japanese Business Ideology and Labour Policy", 
Colombia Journal of World Business,. 12 (Spring 1977), 22-29. 
McCord, William. "The Japanese Model", in Charles K. Wilber, ed.. 
The Political Econoty of Development and Underdevelopment. 
New York: Randan House, 1973. 
Minami, Hisoshi. The Turning Point in Econcmic Development: Japanese 
Experience. Tokyo: Kinokunia, 1973. 
Mundlak, Y., J. Strauss. "Occupational Migration Out of Agriculture 
in Japan", Journal of Development Econonics, 5 (March 1978), 55-71. 
Nandki, M. "The Farm Population in the National Econoiy Before and 
After World War II", Econcmic Development and Cultural Change, 
9 ( I960 )f 29-41. 
Nelson, Richard R. "Growth Models and the Escape Fran the Low Level 
Equilbrium Trap: The Case of Japan", Econcmic Development and 
Cultural Change, 8 (October 1959), 378-388. 
O.E.C.D. O.E.C.D. Econcmic Survey, Japan. Paris: 1968. 
O.E.C.D. O.E.C.D. Econcmic Survey, Japan. Paris: 1969. 
O.E.C.D. O.E.C.D. Econcmic Survey, Japan. Paris: 1975. 
O.E.C.D. O.E.C.D. Outlook. Paris: 1977. 
Ohkawa, Kazushi, and Bruce F. Johnston. "The Transferability of the 
Japanese Pattern of Modernizing Traditional Agriculture", in 
Erik Thorbecke, ed., The Role Of Agriculture in Econcmic 
Development. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. 
Ohkawa, Kazushi, et al. The Growth Rate of the Japanese Econcmy Since - 
1878. Japan: Kinokunia, 1957. 
161 
Ohkawa, Kazushi^ and H. Rosovsky. Japanese Econcjmic Gra\^. Stanford; 
Stanford University Press, 1973. 
Ohkawa, Kazushi . and H. Rosovsky. "The Role of Agriculture in Jfodem 
Japanese Econanic Development", Economic development and cultu- 
ral Change, 9 (1960), 43-67. 
Okita, Saburo. Causes and Problems of Rapid Grcwth in Pos-bvar Japan. 
Tokyo: Japan Econonic Research Center, 1967. 
Okita, Saburo, and Takeo Miki. "Treatment of Foreign Capital - A Case 
Study for Japan", in John H. Mler, ed.. Capital rfovements and 
Economic Development. London; JdacMillan, 1967. 
Pain, Suzanne H. "Wage Differentials in the Japanese Manufacturing 
Sector", Oxford Economic Papers, 23 (July 1971), 212-38. 
Patrick, Hugh, and.Henery Rosovsky, ed. Asia's New Giant. Washington D.C.: 
The Brookings Institute, 1976. 
Pratt, H. Japan - Where Ancient Loyalties Survive. American Council, 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1937. 
"The Risen Sun"f The Econcmist. (May 27, and June 23, 1967). 
Rosovsky, Henery. Capital Formation in Japan. New York: Free Press, 1961. 
Rosovsky, Henery. "Japan's Transformation to Modem Econcmic Growth, 
1868-1885", in H. Rosovsky, ed.. Industrialization in Two Systems. 
New York: Wiley, 1966. 
Rosovsky, Henery, and K. Ohkawa. "The Indigenous Con^xDnents in the 
Modem Japanese Econcmy", Econcmic Development&Cultural Change, 
9 (J^ril 1961), 476-501. 
Rubens, Edwin P. "Foreign Capital and Dcmestic Development in Japan", 
in Simon Kuznets, et al. eds., Econcmic Growth; Brazil, India, Japan. 
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1955. 
Sanscm, George B. Japan, A Short Econcmic History. London; The 
Cresset Press, 1962. 
aidth, Thcmas C. The Agrarian Origins of Modem Japan. Stanford: 
Stanford.University Press, 1959. 
Tsuru, Shigeto. "Survey of Economic Research in Postwar Japan", American 
Econcmic Reviet^, 54 (1964), 79-101. 
Winiecki, Jan. "Japan's Import of Technology", Intereconcroics, (April - 
March 1978), 77-81. 
